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DEFENDING IMMINENCE: FROM BATTERED
WOMEN TO IRAQ
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Notably, over seventy percent of Americans supported going to war against Iraq.1
Irrespective of the United States’ ultimate ability to find weapons of mass
destruction,2 at the time the United States went to war, the average American
believed that the attack was a justifiable act of self-defense.3
*
Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Institute for Law &
Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law, Camden. For comments on drafts of this
Article, I thank Vera Bergelson, Roger Clark, Michael Dorff, Joshua Dressler, Doug Husak,
Ken Kessler, Jeff McMahan, Rick Singer, Allan Stein, and Beth Stephens. I also benefited
from early conversations with Gary Bass, Stephen Morse, and Paul Robinson. Special
thanks are due to Larry Alexander and Dennis Patterson for probing critiques that tested the
limits of my arguments. Invaluable research assistance was provided by Heather Baker,
Elizabeth Kearney, Sarah Rubino, Sarah Sanders, and Bryan Sgrignoli.
1.
See ABC News, Washington Post Poll: Latest, at http://www.polling
report.com/iraq.htm (Apr. 16, 2003) (N=504 adults nationwide. MoE ± 4.5. Fieldwork by
TNS Intersearch):
Do you support or oppose the United States having gone to war with
Iraq?
Support
Oppose
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%
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26
2
3/20/03
72
26
2
2.
Cf. infra note 93 (noting post-war events, including the United States’
inability to find weapons of mass destruction and reported errors in President Bush’s State
of the Union address).
3.
See, e.g., Richard Pearsall & Jim Walsh, S. Jersey Transfixed by Onset of
War, COURIER-POST, Mar. 20, 2003, at 1A (quoting one New Jersey resident as saying, “It’s
scary. It really is scary for our country and our children . . . . As a country, we have to back
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The Bush Administration made three legal arguments to justify the war.
The first two claims were that the Security Council implicitly authorized the use of
force and that the attacks would liberate the Iraqi people.4 The third, and arguably
most important, claim was that of self-defense.5 As President Bush described
during his State of the Union:
Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans, this
time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial, one
canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror
like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power
to make sure that day never comes.6

In claiming the war against Iraq was an act of self-defense, the United
States staked out a position contrary to established international law. International
law holds that self-defense may be employed against an attack that has already
occurred,7 and there is an ongoing dispute over whether even a threat that is
imminent, i.e., “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation,” suffices for the use of defensive force.8 Yet, at the time
the United States went to war, Iraq had not invaded American soil, nor were Iraqi
troops amassed on its borders.
him [Bush] up. He’s doing this for the protection of our country and our safety.”);
September 11 Group Condemns Iraq War, CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/
20/sprj.irq.911.reaction/index.html (Mar. 20, 2003) (quoting one September 11th group
member as opining, “Contrary to popular opinion, Saddam Hussein has not had three
months to disarm, he has had 10 years and that’s important for the public to know. We
aren’t rushing into this. If we don’t act now to get these weapons away from him, we are
going to suffer.”); Michael Symons, Most NJ Residents Fear More Attacks, COURIER-POST
ONLINE, at http://www.southjerseynews.com/issues/september/m090802b.htm (Sept. 8,
2002) (noting one person’s support for the war: “I certainly feel there’s a need to have
something done. I believe there’s enough evidence that I’ve seen to convince me that he’s
[Saddam] certainly our enemy at this point, and we need to do something.”); Gene
Vernacchio & Jason Nark, Debate Reveals Division Among College Students, COURIERPOST, Mar. 20, 2003, at 9A (noting a college student’s reaction that “This is our last resort. I
think we have to do this. Saddam has already used weapons of mass destruction against his
own people and I don’t see why he wouldn’t use them again.”).
4.
Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2003/351
(Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter “March 20, 2003 Letter”]; MARK A. DRUMBL, SELF-DEFENSE,
PREEMPTION, FEAR: IRAQ, AND BEYOND 5–6, 36 (Wash. & Lee Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 03-04, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=382863.
International law scholars are skeptical of the United States’ claim of implied United
Nations’ authorization. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra, at 19–20; Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as
“Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense, Article 51 (1/2) of the UN Charter, and
International Terrorism, 27 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 35, 40 (2003) (discussing
problems with United States’ reliance on Security Council Resolutions 678, 1154, and
1441).
5.
March 20, 2003 Letter, supra note 4; DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 5.
6.
Michael R. Gordon, Bush Enlarges Case for War by Linking Iraq with
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at A1; see also DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 5.
7.
See infra text accompanying notes 64–65.
8.
See infra text accompanying notes 65–82.
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Rather, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism motivated the change
in the United States’ policy.9 The Bush Administration claimed that it was no
longer fair to require a state to wait until a threat is imminent. With weapons of
mass destruction, an enemy must be stopped upon or prior to possession of these
weapons, because once an enemy uses these materials, it is too late. As the United
States’ National Security Strategy, adopted in the wake of the September 11th
attacks, articulates, “[w]e must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”10 With the implementation of
this strategy in March 2003, the United States rejected international law’s stringent
imminence requirement.
This attack on imminence is not novel. Rather, in domestic criminal law,
the same battle rages. Domestic self-defense doctrine requires that defensive force
be employed to ward off an imminent threat.11 Thus, a battered woman who kills
her sleeping abuser is denied a self-defense instruction.12 Although
nonconfrontational killings are less frequent than their “Burning Bed”13 popular
image suggests,14 these cases likewise call into question the importance of a strict
imminence requirement.
While not imminent, the harm to a battered woman may be inevitable.15 A
battered woman may lack any meaningful alternatives to the use of deadly force.

9.
10.

See infra text accompanying notes 84–86 and notes 158–59.
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
15 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter

AMERICA
“NSS”].
11.
See infra text accompanying notes 54–62.
12.
See infra Section II.C.
13.
FAITH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980).
14.
See infra note 131.
15.
Of course, we should be hesitant to stereotype the “battered woman.” See
LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 16 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that
battered women come from all classes and demographic groups); Mary Ann Dutton,
Critique of the “Battered Woman Syndrome” Model, available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/
documents/vawnet/bws/bws.html (last revised Jan. 1997) (noting that there is no one way
that battering affects women, and that “[v]ariations in women’s traumatic response to
battering are based on characteristics of (1) the violence and abuse, (2) the battered victim,
and (3) the context or environment in which battering occurs and in which the battered
woman must respond to and heal from it, e.g., based on racial and cultural factors, social
class, social support.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8–20 (1991) (arguing that stereotypes of
‘battered women” cause many abused women to reject that they fall into that category and
thus these abused women fail to see the dangerous situations of which they are a part);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 105,
117 (1990) (noting that the denotation of “battered woman” covers and perhaps masks a
wide array of diverse experiences, ranging from minor incidents to very serious abuse);
Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive
Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 1002 (1995) (“Contrary to popular belief, most battered
women actively use help-seeking and escape strategies throughout their battering
relationships. Battered women seek medical care for their injuries even more promptly than
auto accident victims and . . . are typically forthright about their situation when asked.”).

216

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:213

She may be unable to leave because of socioeconomic factors.16 Her area may lack
shelters, and the police may be unable to protect her from her abuser everywhere
and all the time.17 Indeed, in a number of cases, police have counseled battered
women not to file complaints so as to avoid provoking their abusive husbands.18
Moreover, when battered women have attempted to leave, these attempts have
proven particularly deadly.19
The battered women, who cannot leave, stay in their homes at the mercy
of their husbands. Lacking the size and strength to defend themselves when a
threat is imminent, some battered women likewise seek to modify the concept of
imminence to the capabilities and objectives of their adversaries. These battered
women kill their abusers in nonconfrontational settings, such as when their abusers
are sleeping.
While President Bush is certainly no battered woman, the attacks on the
imminence requirement are strikingly parallel. Both President Bush and the
battered woman argue that the harm is inevitable, and this inevitability triggers
their rights to self-defense. Both claim the imminence requirement is ill-equipped
to mediate their situations, be it abusive husbands or weapons of mass destruction.
If the harm is inevitable, why, they ask, must we wait until it is imminent?
The war against Iraq and nonconfrontational killings by battered women
are thus two recent examples of a more general theoretical problem. The
underlying question is when may a defender act in self-defense. While some
nineteenth century common law cases vested the rights in the defender, arguing
that it was unfair to force her to live in fear,20 contemporary domestic and
Despite these legitimate objections to stereotyping battered women, there exist real
women who cannot leave and have opted to kill their abusers in nonconfrontational settings.
It is immaterial whether these instances represent that majority or minority of “battered
women” cases because whatever their proportion, these nonconfrontational killings present
a real dilemma for criminal law doctrine.
16.
Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 271 (2002) (“It may be
economically infeasible for the woman to leave because she has no money, job, child care,
or housing.”); Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 119 (“The difficulties of leaving are in part
social and economic. Women lack resources to move out, to support themselves and their
children.”). These women also risk losing their children. Battered woman’s syndrome has
also proven a tool for batterers, as abusive husbands use the learned helplessness theory to
argue that their wives are unfit parents and thereby gain custody of the children. Melanie
Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
141, 180 (1995).
17.
Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 119. For a haunting depiction of the police’s
lack of either ability or desire to protect a woman who was being stalked by a fellow officer,
see Pennsylvania v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).
18.
Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 119.
19.
See WALKER, supra note 15, at 11 (“[T]he most dangerous point in the
domestic violence relationship is at the point of separation.”); Mahoney, supra note 15, at
5–6 (“At the moment of separation or attempted separation . . . the batterer’s quest for
control often becomes most acutely violent and potentially lethal.”).
20.
Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II—Honest But
Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 497 n.212 (1987) (“A

2004]

DEFENDING IMMINENCE

217

international law cast the balance decidedly on the side of the aggressor, by forcing
the defender to wait until the aggressor’s attack is imminent.21 President Bush and
the battered woman simply ask whether the pendulum swung too far in the
aggressor’s favor. Why wait for imminence, if the defender needs to act earlier?
In response to the plight of battered women, many criminal law scholars
advocate jettisoning the imminence requirement. They contend that imminence’s
role is simply to establish necessity. It thus follows that in those situations where
imminence proves to be a poor proxy for necessity, the need to act trumps the
imminence requirement. Exporting such reasoning to international law yields the
conclusion that America’s war against Iraq could also be justified by a showing of
sufficient need.
This Article claims that the significance of the imminence requirement is
independent of the needs of the defender. Self-defense is not merely selfpreferential acting. Rather, self-defense is best understood as a limited right to
respond to aggression. Imminence serves as the actus reus for aggression,
separating those threats that we may properly defend against from mere inchoate
and potential threats. Thus, when one seeks to pull at the thread of imminence, the
fabric of self-defense itself unravels.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets forth the international and
domestic laws of self-defense and describe the recent challenges posed by the war
against Iraq and by battered women. Part III argues that these two challenges rest
on the same moral claim: that a defender should be able to act when necessary.
Part III then discusses the arguments for an “immediately necessary” standard for
self-defense, a standard that has been proposed by many criminal law scholars, and
shows how this view purports to answer the concerns of international law theorists.
Part IV argues that the “immediately necessary” standard is misguided. It collapses
number of cases in the nineteenth century allowed a preemptive strike, even if they
otherwise required there be a reasonable belief as to the threat’s imminence.”); e.g., Carico
v. Kentucky, 7 Bush 124, 127 (Ky. 1870).
Now, if a man feels unsure that his life is in continual danger, and that to
take the life of his menacing enemy is his only safe security, does not the
rationale of the principle as thus defined allow him to kill that enemy
whenever and wherever he gives him a chance and there is no sign of
relenting?
Id; see also Philips v. Kentucky, 2 Duv. 328, 330–32 (Ky. 1865) (holding no duty to retreat
in instances where actor had been previously threatened by a “determined and persevering
enemy” because neither “the public interest [nor] the reason of law require[d] the appellant
to continue to skulk and endure the agony of impending death”). But cf. Oder v. Kentucky,
80 Ky. 32, 37 (Ky. 1882) (self-defense does not authorize the defendant “to hunt down or
seek another for the purpose of killing him”); Williams v. Tennessee, 3 Heisk. 376, 400
(Tenn. 1872).
That the defendant did the killing under an apprehension, honestly
entertained, that the deceased might, or would, in some of his drunken
moments, gratify his thirst for his blood, we think the proof fully shows;
but that at the time of the killing, he was in any danger whatever of then
losing his life, or that he so believed, the proof wholly fails to show.
Id.
21.
See infra text accompanying notes 54–82.
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the important distinction between self-defense and other necessary acts of selfpreference. Moreover, it mistakenly presupposes that the purpose of the
imminence requirement is simply to establish necessity. The importance of
imminence, however, lies in how it informs our understanding of the types of
threats that trigger a legitimate defensive response. Imminence, in effect, serves as
the actus reus of aggression. The claim that imminence can be subsumed within
the necessity calculation misunderstands the relevance of this requirement to our
conception of self-defense.

II. TWO RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE IMMINENCE REQUIREMENT
A. The Right to Self-Defense: Domestic and International Law
Both domestic and international law recognize a right to self-defense.
Self-defense is typically viewed as a justification, not an excuse.22 When an actor’s
conduct is justified, we claim that she did the right or permissible thing.23 An actor
is excused, on the other hand, when she has done something wrongful, but cannot
fairly be blamed or punished for this wrongdoing.24 A classic instance of excuse is
insanity.25 This dichotomy is often articulated as the distinction between speaking
to the character of the act (justification) and speaking to the accountability of the
actor (excuse).26
Despite the fact that both defenses result in acquittal, the distinction is
relevant to send clear moral messages regarding permissible and wrongful
conduct; to determine the liability of accomplices; and to determine the
permissibility of second and third-party conduct.27 Hence, if self-defense is
justified, the actor did the right or permissible thing. Others are authorized to come
to her aid, and her aggressor is prohibited from resisting.

22.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (casting “Use of Force in Self-Protection” under
Article 3’s “General Principles of Justification”); PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 95 (1997).
23.
Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts
and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1161 (1987). There is some debate as to
whether justifications are rights or permissions. See id. at 1161 n.22 (noting that selfdefense may be permissible as opposed to “right”); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DEFENSE 178–79 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that international lawyers view selfdefense as a “right” but not a “duty”); Claire O. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as Rational
Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 621, 624 (1996) (“In the criminal law, to call a violation of a
prohibitory norm justified is to say not only that it is permissible, but that it is
encouraged.”); George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a
Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355, 1359 (1979) (rejecting
permissibility definition in favor of a view of justification as right action); Hibi Pendleton, A
Critique of Rational Excuse Defense: A Reply to Finkelstein, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 651, 665
(1996) (critiquing Finkelstein’s narrow definition of justification).
24.
Dressler, supra note 23, at 1163.
25.
ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 69.
26.
Id.; GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 759 (1978).
27.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.05, at 217–18 (3d
ed. 2001); ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 105.
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In addressing the need for the imminence requirement, it is important to
resist the temptation to hide behind the justification/excuse dichotomy. Criminal
theorists love to recast these lines,28 and the easy course would simply be to ask
whether attacks without imminence may be excused, even if they are not justified.
Indeed, the battered woman’s situation, at least, may fit within the excuse
paradigm. That is, rather than claiming that what she did was right, the battered
woman may claim that she should be excused because her rationality was impaired
because of her partner’s persistent abuse and psychological domination.29
Alternatively, in lieu of invoking a quasi-insanity excuse,30 a battered woman
might claim that she lacked a fair opportunity to do otherwise, and thus, she should
be treated similarly to a person acting under duress.31 Thus, the battered woman’s
acquittal might be secured by simply turning to excuse.
28.
See, e.g., Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1494 (1999) (offering a broad excuse of preemptive selfprotection while simultaneously limiting the scope of justifiable self-defense); Finkelstein,
supra note 23, at 647 (offering a theory of rational excuse to encompass permissible selfdefense).
29.
See, e.g., Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 42–43
(1986) (arguing the reasonable battered woman standard is a theory of excuse, not
justification).
30.
The impaired rationality excuse for battered women is now being rejected
because it pathologizes battered women and treats them as irrational and excused, rather
than rational and right. See Burke, supra note 16, at 301–08 (arguing that the imminence
requirement should be abandoned but that the reasonable person standard should not be
subjectivized to include the psychological make-up of the battered woman and contending
that this approach has the benefits of acknowledging diversity among battered women,
treating women as competent, rational decision makers, and avoiding the “abuse excuse” of
which modern juries tend to be skeptical); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 87 (1994) (“the battered woman syndrome defense, at least as it is presently
constituted, is profoundly anti-feminist”); Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their
Sleeping Tormenters: Reflections on Maintaining Respect for Human Life while Killing
Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259, 268
(Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester, eds., 2002) (battered woman’s syndrome pathologizes
women and “replaces the stereotype of the hysterical woman with the battered one”);
Dutton, supra note 15 (“Battered woman syndrome language creates a stereotyped image of
pathology.”); Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 122.
The highly individualized, highly contextualized standard sought on
behalf of battered women not only legitimates the notion that women . . .
are fundamentally different from men, but it does so in a context where
those differences carry powerfully negative connotations. The Walker
approach sees these women as passive, self-effacing, volatile and
sometimes irrational.
Id.
31.
E.g., Dressler, supra note 30, at 276–78 (advocating a “lack of fair
opportunity” excuse for battered women to avoid the pathologizing effect of placing them
within incapacity excuses); see generally Alexander, supra note 28, at 1494 (suggesting the
unified excuse of preemptive self-protection: “It shall be a defense to any crime that the
defendant committed it to avoid harm to himself or others, and a ‘person of reasonable
firmness’ in the defendant’s situation would have committed the crime.”).
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Such a move, however, would rob the defender’s claim of moral
justification, and in so doing, would fail to address the concerns of international
lawyers. After all, among the international community, one country does not
generally “excuse” another, accepting that the nation did wrong but this wrong was
understandable.32 More importantly, the attack on imminence sounds in
justification, not excuse. It is a claim of right, not a plea of irresponsibility. Indeed,
justifications are action-guiding but excuses are not.33 Thus, we should refrain
from simply moving this to a claim of excuse. The question here is whether
imminence is a required element of justified self-defense.
Self-defense is not punishment.34 Rather, self-defense is a limited right to
engage in preemptive action.35 It is the possibility of future harm that triggers the
right to act in self-defense.36
While the law may unfortunately blur the lines between prevention and
punishment,37 it is imperative that we place self-defense clearly on the prevention
side of the divide. Punishment intuitions are irrelevant to the employment of
defensive force. Thus, despite any intuitions that an abusive husband got exactly
what he deserved, these intuitions, sounding in desert and therefore retribution, are
irrelevant. A battered woman “cannot put herself in the position of judge and
executioner.”38 Citizens may not punish.39

32.
Maybe, however, it should. Cf. Alexander, supra note 28, at 1498 (arguing
that since societies are comprised of individuals perhaps excuse should apply to societies as
well); Singer, supra note 20, at 497 n.212 (“There is little discussion of whether a state
which honestly, though reasonably [sic], believes itself in danger can legitimately wage a
‘preventive war.’“).
33.
SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION
OF HOMICIDE 23 n.28 (1994).
34.
George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57
U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 562 (1996) (“the distinction between punishment and self-defense is
fundamental”).
35.
DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.02[D][1], at 230; Alexander, supra note 28, at
1476 (“Self-defensive force is always preemptive.”).
36.
Alexander, supra note 28, at 1477 (“It is analogous to civil commitment of
the dangerous, gun control, ‘no contact’ orders, preemptive military strikes, and other
practices in which the future dangerousness of others, not their past transgressions, is taken
to justify depriving them of life, liberty, or property.”).
37.
See Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265,
277 (1999) (trenchantly criticizing the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Kansas v.
Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), as “a transparent attempt to fill the gap [between
criminal and civil confinement] with a make-weight justification that seeks to bring the
Kansas scheme within the confines of traditional civil confinement”); Paul Robinson,
Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1429, 1434–39 (2001) (discussing instances where the criminal law is “punishing
dangerousness”).
38.
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 556.
39.
Accord Dressler, supra note 30, at 272 ( “If the ‘penalty’ of death is going to
be imposed—if the judgement that a person deserves to die is going to be made—it ought to
come from society as a whole, upon conviction by a jury.”).
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This distinction is far more clearly drawn in the domestic context than in
the international sphere. For example, Operation Enduring Freedom was justified
as self-defense.40 But the United States’ actions did not really fit the paradigm of
self-defense: the justifying armed attack had come and gone. Rather, the United
States’ actions were actually in accord with either punishment or war.41 However,
for purposes of evaluating the legitimacy of preemptive strikes, such as the United
States’ war against Iraq, the justification of such actions will turn on the right to
prevent, not the right to punish.
Domestically, self-defense is a general exception to the prohibition
against harming others. Every state adopts the defense and it is applicable, as one
might expect, to the offense of homicide.42
40.
Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 559, 560 (2002).
41.
Accord id. at 584 (“[T]he distinction between reprisal and self-defense may
sometimes be difficult to discern in responding to specific acts of terror.”). See generally
LEILA NADYA SADAT, TERRORISM AND THE RULE OF LAW (Wash. Univ. School of Law
Working Paper No. 03-01-02, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=387460
(criticizing the treatment of the September 11 attacks as war, rather than crime, and
discussing the negative repercussions of such a position).
42.
ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2003) (use of force in defense of person); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.335 (Michie 2003) (justification: use of deadly force in defense of self); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (West 2003) (justification; self-defense); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2607 (Michie 2002) (use of deadly force in defense of a person); CAL. PENAL CODE § 197
(West 2003) (justifiable homicide; any person); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (West
2003) (use of physical force in defense of a person); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19
(West 2003) (use of physical force in defense of person); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464
(2002) (use of force in self-protection); United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir.
1973); FL. STAT. ch. 782.02 (2003) (justifiable use of deadly force); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-321 (2003) (use of force in defense of self or others, including justifiable homicide;
conflicting rules); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304 (2002) (use of force in self-protection);
IDAHO CODE § 18-4009 (Michie 2003) (justifiable homicide by any person); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 5/7-1 (West 2003) (use of force in defense of person); IND. CODE ANN. § 3541-3-2 (West 2003) (use of force to protect person or property); IOWA CODE ANN. § 704.3
(West 2003) (defense of self or another); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3211 (2002) (use of force
in defense of person); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (Michie 2003) (use of force in selfprotection); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (West 2003) (justifiable homicide); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (West 2003) (physical force in defense of person); Wilson v.
Maryland, 276 A.2d 214 (Md. 1971); Massachusetts v. Crowley, 43 N.E. 509 (Mass. 1896);
Michigan v. Heflin, 456 N.W.2d 10 (Mich. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 609.065 (2002)
(justifiable taking of life); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2003) (justifiable homicide); MO.
REV. STAT. § 563.031 (2003) (use of force in defense of persons); MONT. CODE ANN. § 453-102 (2003) (use of force in defense of person); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409 (2002) (use of
force in self-protection); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (2002) (“justifiable homicide”
defined); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (2002) (physical force in defense of person); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2C:3-4 (2003) (use of force in self-protection); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-7
(Michie 2002) (justifiable homicide by citizen); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.20 (McKinney 2003)
(justifiable homicide by citizen); North Carolina v. Gappins, 357 S.E.2d 654 (N.C. 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (2001) (self-defense); Ohio v. Robbins, 388 N.E.2d 755
(Ohio 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 643 (2002) (force against another not unlawful, when—
self-defense—defense of property); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.219 (2003) (limitations on use of
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Likewise, self-defense is an exception to the international community’s
ban on the use of force. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter broadly
prohibits the use of force.43 Nations are forbidden, not just from waging war, but
also from force short of war and from issuing threats of force.44 One exception to
the ban on force is Article 51, which permits nations to engage in self-defense:45
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”46
Both domestic and international law require that the self-defensive force
be necessary. This necessity component has two parts: the actor may only act when
necessary and to the extent necessary.47 The latter requirement is one of
proportionality.
Domestic self-defense doctrine defines proportionality broadly. Indeed,
killing is authorized in self-defense even when it is impermissible as punishment.48
Thus, criminal law permits the use of deadly force to be employed in self-defense
against threats of death, grievous bodily harm, rape, and kidnapping.49 The
deadly force); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (West 2002) (use of force in self-protection);
Rhode Island v. Tribble, 428 A.2d 1079 (R.I. 1981); South Carolina v. Day, 535 S.E.2d 431
(S.C. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (Michie 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611
(2002) (self defense); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 2003) (self-defense); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (2002) (force in defense of person); Vermont v. Shaw, 721 A.2d 486
(Vt. 1998); Virginia v. Gilbert, 506 S.E.2d 543 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.16.050 (West 2003) (homicide—by other person—when justifiable); West
Virginia v. Headley, 558 S.E.2d 324 (W. Va. 2001); WIS. STAT. § 939.48 (2003) (selfdefense and defense of others); Nunez v. Wyoming, 383 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 1963).
43.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of
Preemptive Self-Defense 3 (Aug. 6, 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/
taskforce/oconnell.pdf.
44.
DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 84.
45.
The utopia envisioned by the drafters of the Charter was one in which the
United Nations could effectively, in almost all instances, prevent aggression and when such
prevention failed, there would be a global, United Nations-led, response. THOMAS M.
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 2–3 (2002). As Thomas Franck notes, the UN Charter
envisions a “bifurcated regime”: “one that postulates a common, absolute global response to
aggression, but which also makes realistic allowance for state action during the potentially
prolonged transition from contemporary realpolitik to an ideal future of UN-orchestrated
collective security.” Id. at 3.
46.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
47.
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 105 (2000); 2
PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c), at 77 (1984).
48.
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for rape is
unconstitutional); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND
THE LAW ON TRIAL 29 (1988) (“Even legal systems that have abolished the death penalty
permit the use of deadly force in the defense of vital interests.”).
49.
E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4) (2003) (authorizing deadly force against
“death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
threat”); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-05-03 (2003) (authorizing force to defendant against
“unlawful bodily injury, sexual assault, or detention by such other person”).
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important relationship for the self-defense proportionality requirement is between
the degree of force threatened and the degree of force used to repel that threat.50
While in domestic law, necessity is a question of whether force is needed
to repel a harmful attack, the international corollary is that the use of force must be
employed to achieve a legitimate military objective.51 The proportionality
requirement necessitates the balancing of that military objective with the innocent
lives that may be lost.52 Finally, international law contains an immediacy
requirement—the defender must not wait too long before responding to an armed
attack.53
Only certain types of threats trigger the right to self-defense. The threat
must be of imminent, unlawful force. Hence, an actor may not defend against the
lawful use of force by a police officer.54 However, “unlawful” broadly
encompasses conduct that would constitute a tort or a crime, thus authorizing
defensive force against even the insane and the immature.55 A threat is imminent if
it will occur “immediately” or “at once.”56 This requirement has two temporal
aspects.57 Force may not be employed too soon, but it also may not be employed
too late.58 Retaliation is not self-defense.59
Domestic self-defense is wholly preventative, authorizing the defender to
use force before an attack occurs. In predicting the threat, the actor must honestly
and reasonably believe that she needs to use force. Even if her belief is mistaken,
so long as a reasonable person would also have such a belief, her self-defense

50.
Despite the adoption of a proportionality rule, most jurisdictions do not
require retreat before the use of deadly force, and no jurisdiction requires retreat before the
use of non-deadly force. DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.02[C][2], at 226–27; ROBINSON,
supra note 47, § 131(d)(3), at 85. Even in those jurisdictions that require retreat, the
defendant is not required to retreat from her home. DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.02[C][3],
at 228. A rare exception to the “castle exception” is when the aggressor and defendant are
both co-dwellers. Id. § 18.02[C][3], at 229.
In failing to require the victim to retreat, the law may be viewed as contradictory. See
FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 27 (“Terms like imminence, necessity, and proportionality take
on differing connotations, depending on the theory in which they are anchored.”);
Alexander, supra note 28, at 1480 (noting that some codes do not require retreat but adopt a
proportionality requirement and calling such codes “internally contradictory”); Sanford H.
Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CAL. L. REV. 871,
887 (1976) (noting the “uneasy tension” between the principle of autonomy and the
principle of aggression); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
1235, 1271–72 (2001) (discussing the two conflicting views of necessity).
51.
O’Connell, supra note 43, at 7–8.
52.
Id. at 8.
53.
DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 235–36.
54.
DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.03[D][2], at 231.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. § 18.02[D][1], at 229 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY).
57.
FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 18–20.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
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claim obtains.60 When the actor honestly believes that self-defense is necessary but
this belief is unreasonable, the actor either fully or partially loses the defense.61
The defendant also loses the defense if she provokes the fight or is the initial
aggressor.62 Thus, domestic self-defense must always confront the question—at
what point is a defender authorized to use force? How far must the aggressor have
come? How good a prediction must it be?
In the international context, self-defense—and the validity of repelling an
imminent attack—is a more complex matter. In the international domain, two
types of self-defense are possible: preemptive and reactive. Acting against an
imminent threat is preemptive, as it predicts that an attack will occur and seeks to
abate it ahead of time. Within the range of preemptive actions, self-defense may
respond to imminent attacks—“anticipatory self-defense” or contingent and
possible threats—“preventative” or “precautionary” self-defense.63
But self-defense may also be reactive. For example, if one country
invades another, the victim country acts in self-defense when it repels the invaders.
In such instances, the attack has already occurred; the victim country is not
predicting future harm.
By its language, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter only authorizes
reactive self-defense: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”
International law scholars are divided on the question of whether there exists a
post-Charter right to preemptive self-defense.64 Some international law scholars,
“restrictionists,” believe that Article 51 restricts the use of defensive force to
60.
DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.01[E], at 222. One may legitimately question,
why, to be excused, the battered woman’s belief needs to be reasonable under any standard,
as opposed to simply honestly held. See Singer, supra note 20, at 513 (“If, as I believe,
moral stigma is not merely relevant but indeed the only distinguishing factor of the criminal
law from civil law, it follows that any mistake of fact, no matter how unreasonable, should
exculpate.”). The question of whether the reasonably mistaken actor is justified or excused
is hotly debated in the literature. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 101 (arguing a
reasonably mistaken actor is excused); Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of
Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32
UCLA L. REV. 61, 93–95 (1984) (arguing against Fletcher’s view of mistakes and
maintaining, inter alia, that our intuitions tell us that reasonably mistaken actors may be
justified and that a rule utilitarian may wish to encourage individuals to act on reasonable
beliefs); Fletcher, supra note 34, at 564 (arguing that a reasonable mistake is excused); Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897,
1903, 1919–20 (1984) (arguing that the reasonably mistaken actor is justified).
61.
DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.01[E], at 223. At common law, the defendant
was guilty of murder; however, an increasing number of jurisdictions allow for imperfect
self-defense, which reduces the murder to manslaughter. Id. Under the Model Penal Code, if
the actor is reckless or negligent in her belief, she is guilty of manslaughter or negligent
homicide respectively. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09.
62.
DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.02[B], at 224; e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 108 (West 2003) (defensive force is not justifiable if the person “provoked the use
of unlawful, nondeadly force by such other person” or “was the initial aggressor”).
63.
DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 29–30.
64.
See generally GRAY, supra note 47, at 86–87 (summarizing the positions).
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situations where an armed attack has already occurred,65 while other international
law scholars, “anti-restrictionists,” view the reference to “inherent right” as
incorporating a right to anticipatory self-defense.66
Even for anti-restrictionists, the attack must be imminent. They claim that
customary international law as embodied by the Caroline precedent continues to
set the parameters of anticipatory self-defense:67 the necessity of force must be
“instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”68
Anti-restrictionists support their claim by pointing to the discourse
surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six-Day War, and the Israeli attack on

65.
E.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 183–86 (“the right of self-defense is
circumscribed to counter-force stimulated by an armed attack”); FRANCK, supra note 45, at
50 (quoting a leader of the U.S. delegation, Gov. Harold Stassen, as affirming that the
language was intended to trigger the right to self-defense only after an attack had occurred);
see also George P. Fletcher, How Would the Bush Administration’s Claims of Self-Defense,
Used As Justifications for the War Against Iraq, Fare Under Domestic Rules of SelfDefense? (Sept. 10, 2002), available at http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20020910_
fletcher.html (“[The UN Charter] language implies the attack must be underway for selfdefense to be justified. It also implies that the right of self-defense between nations is even
more restricted than that between individuals in domestic society. That seems
counterintuitive: It is hard to believe that it could be the rule that between nations, not even
an imminent attack (troops massing on the border; missiles halfway through the sequence to
launch) will suffice. But that seems to be what the Charter says.”).
There is strong historical support for the restrictionist position. Ironically, it was the
United States that proposed the “armed attack” language to follow the reference to the
inherent right to self-defense. FRANCK, supra note 45, at 50. When the Charter was drafted,
the United States and other “Big Powers” believed that collective security under their
auspices would be sufficient to prevent aggression. Id. at 48.
66.
E.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of
Force, 26 WASH. Q. 89, 92 (2003); DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 23 (arguing that the “inherent
right” language refers to customary international law); Guy R. Phillips, Rules of
Engagement: A Primer, ARMY L. 4, 12 (July 1993).
67.
The Caroline incident involved an English attack on United States citizens,
who were aiding the Canadian rebels, during the MacKenzie Rebellion. ANTHONY CLARK
AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN
CHARTER PARADIGM 18 (1993); DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 243. The United States
protested Britain’s act, but the British claimed self-defense. Five years later, Secretary of
State Daniel Webster, in his correspondence about the incident with British envoys, said
that for a claim of self-defense, Britain must “show a necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” DINSTEIN,
supra note 23, at 243. He also wrote that actions taken must involve “nothing unreasonable
or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it.” Id. This language since became the standard for selfdefense. Arend, supra note 66, at 96; Thomas Graham, National Self-Defense, International
Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2003) (“[Caroline] sets
forth a rule that is still binding precedent.”).
68.
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217, at 412
(1906) (quoting correspondence between Mr. Webster, the US Secretary of State, and Lord
Ashburton, the British plenipotentiary, in relation to the famous Caroline incident).
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the Osirak reactor.69 While nations were reluctant to invoke openly a right to
anticipatory self-defense,70 underlying the discussions within the United Nations
was the viability of such a right.
First, with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the opponents of the
United States’ conduct took the position that the United States was the aggressor
and Cuba and the Soviet Union, the defenders.71 But such a position implies that if
the United States had been acting defensively, the conduct would have been
justified.72 After all, if the United States’ behavior was not authorized, even as an
act of self-defense, then it mattered little who was the aggressor and who was the
defender.73
The discourse concerning the Six Day War further supports the antirestrictionists’ claim.74 While the UN debates did not openly discuss anticipatory
self-defense, the failure of most states to condemn Israel’s actions speaks to the
implicit viability of the preemptive claim.75

69.
“Although there are undoubtedly many ways to explore state practice
relating to preemption in the post-UN Charter world, perhaps one of the most useful is to
examine debates in the Security Council in cases where questions of preemptive force were
raised.” Arend, supra note 66, at 94; see also DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 2 (arguing that
international law derives from both the UN Charter and customary international law and
that the latter can be assessed by reviewing state practice).
70.
GRAY, supra note 47, at 112 (“the actual invocation of the right to
anticipatory self-defence in practice is rare”). Rather, states claim to have acted in accord
with Articles 2(4) and 51. Thus, the United States claimed that its actions during the Cuban
Missile Crisis were not “force” as set forth by 2(4) and were authorized by the Charter’s
regional peace-keeping provisions. See FRANCK, supra note 45, at 99 (United States argued
that the quarantine did not amount to the use of force forbidden by the Charter); GRAY,
supra note 47, at 113–15 (US relied on peacekeeping provisions thus evincing the
controversial status of anticipatory self-defense as the justification for the use of force); see
also Graham, supra note 67, at 3 (arguing that the United States “came close to a
preemptive use of military force,” involving air strikes and a ground invasion, but ultimately
did not do so, opting instead for a naval quarantine and a peaceful settlement). But see
AREND & BECK, supra note 67, at 75 (“Under generally accepted norms of international
law, a blockade, whether termed a quarantine or not, constitutes a violation of Article
2(4).”).
Likewise, in supporting its attack on Egypt resulting in the Six Day War, Israel argued
that Egypt’s behavior constituted an “armed attack” and thus, Israel’s response was within
the literal authorization of Article 51. FRANCK, supra note 45, at 104; GRAY, supra note 47,
at 113.
71.
AREND & BECK, supra note 67, at 75–76.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Egypt’s behavior was not an armed attack, but was ominous enough. Egypt
closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and amassed troops on the Israeli border.
FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 20–21. Nasser made threats against Israel and secured
command of the armies of both Jordan and Iraq. Id.
75.
FRANCK, supra note 45, at 105.
Most states, on the basis of evidence available to them, did however
apparently conclude that such a armed attack was imminent, that Israel
had reasonably surmised that it stood a better chance of survival if the
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In 1981, when Israel bombed Osirak, an Iraqi nuclear reactor, it invoked
the right to anticipatory self-defense.76 While the Security Council passed a
unanimous resolution, strongly condemning the act,77 states had different reasons
for the condemnation. Some took a restrictionist view of Article 51 and said that
self-defense can only be used in response to an armed attack.78 However, many
other states seemed to support the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, but felt
there was not enough evidence in this instance to show that the attack was truly
imminent.79 England, for example, maintained that Iraq’s purported attack was not
imminent under Caroline.80
In light of these post-Charter events, and the explicit and implicit reliance
on a right to act preemptively, anti-restrictionists claim that Caroline remains the
standard for anticipatory attacks.81 Hence, even to the anti-restrictionist,
preemptive attacks are permissible only when the necessity of force is “instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”82 Thus, an imminence standard sets the outer boundaries for the use
defensive force in international law.
In summary, both domestic and international law recognize a right to selfdefense. Self-defense is best understood as a justification, a claim that the
defendant engaged in right or permissible action. Self-defense is motivated by the
need to prevent future harm, and it is limited by the principles of necessity and
proportionality. While domestic criminal law allows defenders to respond to
imminent attacks, international law remains unsettled as to whether even an
imminent attack is sufficient to justify self-defense. One point remains clear,
however: in both domestic and international law, a defender is not authorized to
act before an attack becomes imminent. The United States’ war against Iraq and
the plight of battered women both pose challenges to this standard. It is to these
challenges that we now turn.
B. The Challenge to Imminence in International Law: The War Against Iraq
In March 2003, the United States went to war against Iraq. The war
implemented the “Bush Preemption Doctrine” set forth in the National Security
Strategy (“NSS”).
attack were pre-empted, and that, therefore, in the circumstances, it had
not acted unreasonably. This does not amount to an open-ended
endorsement of a general right to anticipatory self-defense, but it does
recognize that, in demonstrable circumstances of extreme necessity,
anticipatory self-defense may be a legitimate exercise of a state’s right to
ensure its survival.
Id.
76.
AREND & BECK, supra note 67, at 77–78; GRAY, supra note 47, at 114–15.
77.
S.C. Res. 487 (1981); FRANCK, supra note 45, at 105–06.
78.
AREND & BECK, supra note 67, at 78.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 79.
81.
Arend, supra note 66, at 96; Graham, supra note 67, at 7 (“[Caroline] sets
forth a rule that is still binding precedent.”).
82.
MOORE, supra note 68, § 217, at 412.
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Within the Bush Preemption Doctrine lie a number of important claims.
First, the Bush Preemption Doctrine casts itself as a claim of self-defense:
And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will
act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We
cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So
we must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best
intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge
harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the
new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is
the path of action.83

Second, as a policy of self-defense, the Bush Preemption Doctrine
articulates the earlier Caroline doctrine as the then-governing standard of
international law:
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—
most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces
preparing to attack.84

Third, it rejects Caroline’s stringent temporal requirement, arguing that it
is outdated. Modern warfare problems, namely terrorism, rogue states, and
weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”), render Caroline obsolete:
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do
not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such
attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and,
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that
can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without
warning.
....
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.85

Thus, the Bush Preemption Doctrine stakes out a self-defense position far
broader than Caroline.86 Caroline authorizes self-defense in those instances where
83.
84.
85.
86.

NSS, supra note 10, at v (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
As one critic characterized the NSS:
The US government is working towards a fundamental change in the
existing international law. When Bush says he doesn’t need to ask for
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the necessity of force is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.”87 But the NSS’s “path of action” includes taking
“anticipatory action” “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack.”88 Thus, far from the immediacy of Caroline, the NSS authorizes
first strikes that are planned and are the product of much deliberation.
Despite the claim that the Bush Preemption Doctrine seeks to modify
imminence, it actually seeks to discard it. One might think that the harm posed by
an enemy with weapons of mass destruction is “always imminent” or that
imminence simply needs to be “adapted.” But “always imminent” is a
contradiction in terms. An imminent threat is one that will happen “in an instant”
or “at once.” Yet, an enemy with weapons of mass destruction may act
immediately or in several months or even never. The fear of harm, and in this
sense, the threat of harm, may be ever-present, but harm is imminent only when it
is about to happen.
The misuse of the term, “imminence,” may be due in part to two different
senses of the word, “threat.”89 A threat may be an assault—that is, a forthcoming
battery. Thus, a missile that is currently moving towards a target is a threat to that
target. But a threat may also be something far more inchoate. The possession of
nuclear weapons by North Korea is a threat, not because of the weapons are about
to hit the United States, but because those weapons vest North Korea with
significant power that it could choose to exercise against the United States. Indeed,
this latter more inchoate sense of threats may be what is contemplated in the
United Nations Charter Article 39, providing for Security Council intervention for
“threats to the peace.”90 These “threats to the peace” are distinguished from
“breaches of the peace” and “acts of aggression.”91 But inchoate threats are not
imminent. Rather, it is with regard to assaultive threats that the term “imminence”

anyone’s approval, that is not just the arrogance of power speaking. It’s
also a legal claim. Bush really means it’s legally alright for the US to
make war whenever it deems necessary for its own security. This ‘Bush
doctrine’ was not pronounced in passing, but in a document of critical
importance, the “National Security Strategy” released in September
2002. Attack is the best defence, it says there. . . . Though pre-emptive
self-defence was previously allowed only in case of imminent
aggression, the criterion of imminence is now to be discarded. In the
case of “rogue states,” the mere possibility of their deploying weapons of
mass destruction at some point in time is regarded as sufficient
justification for war.
Dietrich Murswiek, The Exclusive Right of Aggression (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.goethe.de/kug/ges/rch/thm/en41619.htm.
87.
MOORE, supra note 68, § 217, at 412.
88.
NSS, supra note 10, at 15.
89.
I owe the insights in this paragraph to Roger Clark.
90.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (providing “[t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”).
91.
Id.
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applies. Hence, when the United States seeks to act against inchoate threats, it is
not adapting imminence; it is abandoning it.
When the United States went to war with Iraq in March 2003, the Bush
Preemption Doctrine was translated from policy to practice. The argument that the
war against Iraq was a justifiable act of self-defense rested upon two claims. The
first was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and harbored evil intentions
toward the United States, and the second claim was that given this fact, the United
States was justified in attacking Iraq. The first question is empirical, and any
dispute regarding this question concerns the degree of certainty that an actor must
have before attacking. The second claim, however, is a moral claim: that the
United States was entitled to attack Iraq as an act of justifiable self-defense.
Both of these arguments were subjected to challenge. Many
commentators were skeptical that the United States had sufficient evidence of
Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction. Conversely, the U.S.
Department of State vigorously argued for a lower evidentiary standard.92
Thus, one dispute is over the degree of certainty. What is the burden of
proof for the person or nation who wishes to act in self-defense? In the aftermath
of the war, the United States’ claim to have satisfied the burden has become
increasingly undermined by empirical fact and political overstatement.93
But the burden of proof is only part of the problem. The second question
is whether even if Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, its possession of such
weaponry would be sufficient to justify the war. Many scholars thought not.94
92.
The State Department’s website contains an article by Philip Bobbitt that
originally appeared in the Times of London. Bobbitt argues:
We must recognise that the demand for conclusive evidence of weapons
acquisition is an inadequate requirement in the world we are entering. It
confuses deterrence with indictment, as if Saddam were guilty of
violating an international gun control law. In fact, deterrence of WMD
acquisitions has failed once the overt act is committed or the covert act
unmasked. It must be better to take action before we know that the
situation we most fear has indeed come about if we are clear with regard
to his intentions.
Philip Bobbitt, Why the US and the UK Are Right to Target Iraq (Jan. 28, 2003), available
at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/press/0128usuk.htm.
93.
See Thomas L. Friedman, The War over the War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003,
at 4–11 (arguing that because Prime Minister Blair could not sell the good reasons for the
war, both Blair and Bush “hyped the direct threat from Iraq and highlighted flimsy
intelligence suggesting that Saddam was not just a potential problem, but an immediate,
undeterrable threat to British and American mainlands”); James Risen, Bush Aides Now Say
Claim on Uranium Was Accurate, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at A7 (discussing the failure
to find WMD, the failure to discover ties to Al Qaeda, and Bush’s reliance in his State of
the Union address on “evidence that was based in part on fabricated documents and in part
on uncorroborated reports from abroad”).
94.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Is the War on Iraq Lawful?, FINDLAW, Mar. 19,
2003, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20030319.html (noting “the argument
for self-defense must be based on an expansion of that concept—from self-defense as
repelling an ongoing or imminent attack, to self-defense as pre-emption of a feared attack”);
Graham, supra note 67, at 17 (arguing that the NSS, as implemented in our war against Iraq,
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Indeed, it is certainly true that the United States’ self-defense claim was not viable
under international law and the Caroline precedent.95 Still, the question remains
whether international law should remain wed to a stringent temporal imminence
requirement. That is, if the United States’ belief that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction had been justified, would that belief have been sufficient to justify
acting in self-defense?
International law is fluid. “[I]t derives from state behavior and it affects
state behavior.”96 The United States acted in defiance of Caroline, and other
nations supported its decision.97 Given that weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism are realities of the world in which we live, the war against Iraq should
cause us to reflect on whether the right to self-defense should obtain at the time of
need or upon the imminence of harm.
C. Imminence in Criminal Law: The Problem of Battered Women
While the United States can act in what has been described as a “flagrant
violation of international law” with little or no repercussions,98 the battered
woman, who kills in a nonconfrontational setting, does not fare as well. Ignoring
the law is a violation of the law, and indeed, one for which these women are
sentenced to lengthy jail time.99 Thus, if the imminence requirement is not a
necessary element of self-defense, battered women are paying the price for our
failure to delineate the defense properly. Indeed, “[t]he central debate in the theory
of self-defense for the last decade has been whether we should maintain a strict
requirement of imminence in assessing which attacks trigger a legitimate defensive

“is not consistent with international law”); Int’l Ass’n Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms,
International Appeal by Lawyers and Jurists Against the “Preventive” Use of Force (Mar.
2003), available at http://www.lcnp.org/global/LawyersandJuristsAppeal.htm (arguing
“[t]here is no precedent in international law for use of force as a preventative measure when
there has been no actual or imminent attack by the offending State”); Murswiek, supra note
86 (“The US clearly cannot invoke its right to self-defence to justify the war in Iraq, as all
the experts on international law agree. Without the authorization of the Security Council the
American attack is therefore a flagrant violation of international law.”); O’Connell, supra
note 43, at 3 (“the reality is that the United States has no right to use force to prevent
possible, as distinct from actual, armed attacks”).
95.
A related question is whether the United States would have been justified in
attacking Iraq if it had a reasonable, but ultimately mistaken, belief that Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction. The question of whether a reasonably mistaken actor is
justified is debated within the criminal law literature. See supra note 60.
96.
DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 9.
97.
Id. at 33 (addressing the various countries that supported the United States in
ways that ranged from words to troops).
98.
See Murswiek, supra note 86.
99.
See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 5 (1987) (many battered women
who kill their mates “receive stiff prison sentences including, in some cases, life
imprisonment without parole.”). Executive clemency is sometimes available. See Richard
A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 371, 391 & n.56 (1993) (discussing the Judy Norman case).
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response.”100 The problem that has provoked this debate is the case of battered
women.101

100.
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 567.
101.
There is no general defense of “being a battered woman.” DRESSLER, supra
note 27, § 18.05[B][4], at 244. Rather, when a battered woman kills her sleeping abuser, her
claim sounds in self-defense. Issues of abuse may also have bearing on provocation and
duress. See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND
MANSLAUGHTER 153–55 (1998) (discussing the question of timing within the context of
provocation); Burke, supra note 16, at 253 (discussing the application of battered woman
syndrome to duress claims).
Dr. Lenore Walker, who developed the concept of battered woman syndrome (BWS)
in the late 1970s, describes the battered woman’s life as involving a cycle of violence.
WALKER, supra note 15, at 126. The cycle of violence is composed of three distinct phases:
the tension-building phase; the acute battering incident; and the tranquil, sometimes even
loving, phase. Id. at 126–27. In addition, Walker claims that battered women do not leave
because they suffer from learned helplessness. Id. at 117; Dutton, supra note 15; see
generally Martin E. P. Seligman et al., Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 73 J.
ABNORMAL PYSCHOL. 256 (1968). The more recent formulation of BWS describes the
syndrome as a version of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). WALKER, supra note 15, at
117; Dutton, supra note 15. Some scholars have been quite critical of the underlying science
of BWS. E.g., David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the
Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 109–10 (1997) (“The battered woman syndrome
remains little more than an unsubstantiated hypothesis that, despite being extant for over
fifteen years, has yet to be tested adequately or, when adequately tested, has failed to be
corroborated.”).
Battered women challenge traditional self-defense doctrine in ways beyond the scope
of this paper. For example, in those jurisdictions that adopt a retreat requirement and the
castle exception, there is the question whether one must retreat when the aggressor is a codweller. DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.02[C][3], at 228. Any requirement to retreat from
one’s home may have an adverse impact on victims of domestic violence. Id.; see also
Weiand v. Florida, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1056 (Fla. 1999).
[A] duty to retreat from the home adversely affects victims of domestic
violence by placing them at great risk of death or great bodily harm. In
addition, failing to inform jurors that the defendant had no duty to retreat
from the residence when attacked by a co-occupant may actually
reinforce commonly held myths concerning domestic violence victims.
Id.
The question of how the reasonable person standard should be contextualized is highly
problematic in the battered woman context. That is, when asking whether the defendant’s
belief was reasonable, should the jury consider a reasonable person of the defendant’s
gender? Size? The history between the victim and defendant? Should the jury consider what
a “reasonable battered woman” would do, thus incorporating the psychological syndrome
that affects her perception of events and alternatives? See, e.g., Kansas v. Hundley, 693 P.2d
475, 478–80 (Kan. 1985) (“reasonably prudent battered wife”); North Dakota v. Leidholm,
334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (holding the jury should assume “the physical and
psychological properties peculiar to the accused”); Pennsylvania v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d
772, 784 (Pa. 1989) (“reasonably prudent battered woman”); Jahkne v. Wyoming, 682 P.2d
991, 1012–18 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, J., dissenting) (arguing that the reasonable person
standard should have included defendant’s psychological state of being a battered child).
Scholars are quite critical of the “reasonable battered woman standard.” See Dressler, supra
note 30, at 269 (“Put simply, without distorting the meaning of reasonableness beyond
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The saga of Judy Norman illustrates the plight of a battered woman who
could not overcome the imminence requirement. When she was fourteen-yearsold, Judy Norman married John Thomas (J.T.) Norman.102 For twenty-years of
their marriage, Judy endured J.T’s abuse.103 J.T. threw hot coffee at her, put
cigarettes out on her, and broke glass against her face.104 He forced Judy to earn

sensible recognition, a ‘reasonable person’ does not fear instantaneous death from a
sleeping person.”); Stephen J. Morse, The “New Syndrome Excuse Syndrome,” 14 CRIM. J.
ETHICS 3, 13 (Winter/Spring 1995) (arguing the reasonable battered woman test “makes a
mockery of objective standards and of the entire notion of justification, collapsing the
important distinction between justification and excuse”).
Some background facts are relevant, however. After all, if the man sitting on your
couch is a person you have a restraining order against, who has pistol-whipped you,
assaulted you with a knife, and struck you on the head with a tire iron (leading to your
hospitalization), chances are—that when he shows up saying, “I guess I’m just going to
have to kill you sonofabitch. Did you hear me that time?”—he means it. Allery v.
Washington, 682 P.2d 312, 313 (Wash. 1984); see also New Jersey v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364,
378 (N.J. 1984) (“the expert’s testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered
wife, because of the prior beatings, numerous beatings, as often as once a week, for seven
years, from the day they were married to the day he died, is particularly able to predict
accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her”); Gallegos v. New Mexico, 719
P.2d 1268, 1271 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (“Remarks or gestures which are merely offensive or
perhaps even meaningless to the general public may be understood by the abused individual
as an affirmation of impending physical abuse.”); Dressler, supra note 30, at 264 (noting
that experts claim battered women become more attuned to when an attack will occur and
how grave the attack will be). But see Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 45, 73 (“[S]ome battered women may well be able to predict forthcoming abuse with
sufficient accuracy to support a reasonable belief, but these beliefs are the product of neither
a special capacity nor the battered woman syndrome. They reflect an ordinary process of
inductive inference from past behavior in similar circumstances.”).
Testimony regarding battered woman’s syndrome and the learned helplessness theory
helps to establish why the battered woman does not leave, thus supporting the battered
woman’s credibility. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377 (“experts point out that one of the common
myths, apparently believed by most people, is that battered wives are free to leave”);
Dressler, supra note 30, at 264 (“learned helplessness testimony may offset the belief of
jurors that claims of prior abuse are untrue . . . or that, even if true, a woman who remains in
an abusive relationship has a masochistic desire to be beaten”). However, some scholars
argue that BWS lacks descriptive power because it fails to explain why women overcome
learned helplessness and in so doing, choose, not to leave, but to employ deadly force.
Burke, supra note 16, at 246 (“If the battered woman has overcome her learned helplessness
and can appreciate exit options, then the syndrome fails to explain why she exercises the
option of deadly force.”); Faigman & Wright, supra note 101, at 79 (“From a theoretical
perspective . . . one would predict that if battered women suffered from learned helplessness
they would not assert control over their environment; certainly, one would not predict such
a positive assertion as killing the batterer.”); Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 122 (arguing that
the use of BWS to explain imminence and necessity undermines the explanation of why the
woman ultimately killed her husband).
102.
North Carolina v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
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their family’s only income by working as a prostitute.105 At home, he literally
treated her like a dog, forcing her to eat pet food out of pet bowls, to bark like a
dog, and often to sleep on the floor.106 When Judy was pregnant with their fifth
child, J.T. kicked her down a flight of stairs, causing the baby to be born
prematurely.107 J.T. threatened to kill Judy and specifically threatened to cut her
heart out.108 Judy tried to leave several times.109 J.T. always found her, took her
home, and beat her.110
The day before he died, J.T. was arrested for DUI, which angered him
immensely thus causing an escalation in his violence towards Judy.111 The police
were called to the Norman household, but Judy refused to file a complaint out of
fear that her husband would kill her.112 Less than an hour later, Judy attempted
suicide.113 Judy was released from the hospital that evening, and she went home
with her mother.114
The next day, J.T. followed Judy to the social services office where she
was attempting to obtain welfare benefits, and J.T. forced Judy to return home with
him.115 Once Judy was back in his control, J.T. subjected Judy to further torment.
He kicked her in the side of the head while she was driving and threatened to “cut
her breast off and shove it up her rear end.”116 J.T. refused to let Judy eat.117 When
J.T. napped on the bed that afternoon, he made Judy sleep on the concrete floor.118
J.T. also barraged Judy with threats that he would cut her throat, kill her, and cut
off her breast.119 Judy’s daughter informed Judy’s mother about the abuse and the
latter called the sheriff’s department.120 No one came.121
Later that evening, while J.T. slept, the granddaughter whom Judy was
babysitting began to cry.122 Afraid the crying would wake her husband, Judy took
the child to her mother’s house.123 There, she took a pistol from her mother’s
purse.124 Judy returned home and shot J.T. in the back of the head.125

105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
North Carolina v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d
378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
108.
Id.
109.
North Carolina v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 10 (N.C. 1989).
110.
Id.
111.
Id. at 10.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. at 11.
116.
North Carolina v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 588 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
117.
Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 11.
118.
Id.
119.
Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. at 588–89.
124.
Id. at 589.
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Judy Norman was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.126 The North
Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court should have
instructed the jury on self-defense.127 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed.128 It held that Judy Norman was not entitled to a self-defense
instruction.129 The harm was not imminent.130
What was Judy Norman to do? She believed her death to be inevitable,
and perhaps a reasonable person would as well. But her self-defense claim did not
go to the jury. The requirement that the harm be imminent stood in her way.
Assuming that Judy Norman was doomed to a life of abuse, that one day she
would die at J.T.’s hand, that she had no chance of overpowering him during a
confrontation, and that she had no means of escape, were Judy Norman’s actions
wrong? Why was Judy Norman denied the ability to cloak herself with the
justification of self-defense?
Judy Norman is not an aberration.131 In Whipple v. Indiana, the defendant
killed his two abusive parents while they slept.132 The Indiana Supreme Court held
that “the absence of imminent or impending danger . . . precludes the successful
assertion of the defense of self or defense of others as a matter of law.”133 Victoria
125.
Id.
126.
North Carolina v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989).
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
The nonconfrontational setting, where the defendant kills a sleeping victim,
is not the prototypical case it is assumed to be. Rather, most self-defense cases arise in
confrontational settings. In Victoria Nourse’s empirical survey, she found that only 30% of
battered spouse cases were nonconfrontational. She also found that of overall self-defense
cases only 16% were nonconfrontational. Nourse, supra note 50, at 1253. Holly Maguigan’s
empirical survey, which focused specifically on battered women, found that 75% of cases
were confrontational. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397 (1991). Of the
non-confrontational cases, 8% were sleeping man cases, 8% were woman as initial
aggressor during a lull in violence cases, 4% were contract killings, and 5% were
indeterminate because of the dearth of facts in the opinion. Id.
The number of instances, however, does not bear on the ultimate moral question—
which is whether the imminence requirement unduly restricts a morally legitimate claim of
self-defense. Accord Rosen, supra note 99, at 403 (“Norman is not the sort of isolated,
aberrational incident—like shipwrecked sailors forced to eat their comrades to save their
own lives—that can be relegated safely to executive clemency.”).
For other nonconfrontational killings by battered victims, see Reed v. Indiana, 479
N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (Ind. 1985) (defendant not entitled to self-defense instruction because he
shot his parents while they were sleeping); West Virginia v. Smith, 481 S.E.2d 747, 751 (W.
Va. 1996) (defendant who assisted her son in shooting her live-in boyfriend was not entitled
to self-defense instruction because the boyfriend was sleeping and thus did not constitute an
“imminent” threat).
132.
523 N.E.2d 1363, 1366 (Ind. 1988).
133.
Id. at 1367. Admittedly, the facts (at least as reported by the Indiana
Supreme Court) are a bit fishy. But ultimately, the credibility of the witnesses is a jury
determination, and the refusal to instruct on self-defense prevents precisely this inquiry.
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Sands was likewise denied a self-defense instruction.134 Sands, who had been
beaten and threatened with a gun intermittently that day, failed to meet the
imminence requirement when she killed her husband while he took a break from
beating her to lie in bed and watch television.135
And then there is Nelda Lane.136 When Lane left her husband, he called
her and told her that he was going to kill her, graphically describing how he was
going to “slit her open like a wild animal and pull her guts out.”137 He told her he
would track her down, and he would also kill their daughter.138 His last words to
her, at 12:30 a.m., were “You’re dead meat, bitch.”139 Lane believed him, and after
spending all night pacing, Lane got in her car, drove eight miles, entered their
house, and shot her husband three times in the head while he slept.140
Evidence at trial arguably supported the reasonableness of Lane’s fear.
When Lane left, her husband told two of his friends that he planned to “gut the
bitch” and wanted to “put a hit” out on her.141 But the harm to Lane was not
imminent and therefore she was not entitled to a self-defense instruction.142 Lane’s
murder conviction was affirmed on appeal.143
While Lane was the most aggressive in her actions, her fear of death was
quite well-founded. Not only had her husband graphically threatened her, but also
he had communicated this threat to others. Experience has taught us that at the
time of separation, abusive husbands tend to be at their most violent, and that
temporary restraining orders do little to prevent an attack.144 At what point may
Lane act? May she act when he buys the weapon? Comes to her house? Breaks in?
Or will current self-defense doctrine force her to wait until the gun is pointed or
the knife is raised?
Norman, Sands, and Lane each acted before the threat was imminent.
They fell into what Anthony Sebok has cleverly dubbed the “Cape Fear gap.”145
134.
Virginia v. Sands, 553 S.E.2d 733 (Va. 2001).
135.
Id. at 737.
136.
Lane v. Texas, 957 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
137.
Id. at 585–86.
138.
Id. at 586.
139.
Id. at 589 (James, J., dissenting).
140.
Id. at 586 (majority opinion).
141.
Id. at 589 n.1 (James, J., dissenting).
142.
Id. at 586 (arguing verbal threats were not sufficient for fear of immediate
harm) (majority opinion).
143.
Id. at 585 (majority opinion).
144.
Mahoney, supra note 15, at 57–58 (noting that depending on the motivations
of the abuser and his need to control his wife, temporary restraining orders and separation
may be either “extremely effective or tremendously dangerous for women”); Rosen, supra
note 99, at 395 (“The professional literature recently has developed evidence to support the
contention that a woman who is already being battered by an abusive man, and who tries to
leave or get help, is placing her life at risk. In fact, the time of most danger for the woman is
when she attempts to leave; women are often killed when, and because, they attempt escape.
Efforts to involve outside agencies, including the police, similarly escalate the risk to the
woman.”).
145.
CAPE FEAR (MCA/Universal 1961); CAPE FEAR (MCA/Universal 1991).
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That is, there may be a time period when a putative defender may reasonably fear a
deadly attack by a putative aggressor, but the law requires this defender to wait.146
Indeed, the defender must wait until the attack is imminent.
Domestic criminal law and its international law counterpart both require
that a threat be imminent before the defender can lawfully employ defensive force.
Yet, recent experience has led us to question this stringent temporal requirement.
Internationally, the September 11 attacks raised concerns over the traditional
conceptions of enemies, warfare, and weaponry. The United States went to war
with Iraq to prevent a future attack, fearing that the U.S. would be unable to defend
itself if and when the enemy engaged. Likewise, in the domestic context, some
battered women have opted for preemptive strikes, recognizing that only when the
enemy is sleeping does she stand a fighting chance.

III. THE UNDERLYING MORAL CLAIM: NECESSITY AND SELFDEFENSE
A. The Underlying Claim
Fundamentally, the domestic and international challenges to the
imminence requirement rest on the same dilemma. The battered woman fears that
her husband will one day kill her. The American people fear terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. The only recourse in both situations is to strike first.
However, the law condemns such action because an imminent threat is necessary
for the right of self-defense.
While there are differences between the two spheres,147 none of the
differences has any bearing on the theoretical issue underlying both claims. One
146.

As Sebok explains:
In both versions of the film, an ex-convict wages a carefully constructed
terror campaign against his former lawyer and his family. Despite the
fact that the convict never directly confronts or threatens his targets, both
the police and the lawyer quickly conclude with reasonable certainty that
the convict intends to cause grave harm. The problem the film raises is
this: when can the lawyer kill the convict? . . . Cape Fear is a frightening
movie because it reveals that there is a gap between the risks that society
demands we accept and the amount of protection that society is capable
of providing.
Anthony J. Sebok, Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?, 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 725, 744 (1996).
147.
Some theorists claim that the relationship between nations is not equivalent
to the relationship among individuals. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES:
WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 361 (2002) (“The universal view of
international law is flawed in two important respects . . . . First, it mixes the equality of
states, a legal concept, with the decision to use force, a strategic concept, in a way that is
fatal to both, and thus eerily recapitulates the early prehistory of the State, which was first
constituted out of the separation of these two concepts. Thus it treats the society of states as
if it were a society of individuals.”); David J. Luban, Preventive War, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=469862, at 39 (“States are unlike people in virtually every
way.”). While notions of equality may differ, this does not translate into a “might makes
right” view of international law as David Luban rightly notes: “[T]he claim that the double
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difference between international law and criminal law is the relationship between
law and morality. According to Dinstein, a right to self-defense must be proven to
exist in positive international law.148 Moreover, Dinstein asserts that international
law could eliminate the right to self-defense.149 On the other hand, the individual’s
right to self-defense is a moral right, which we believe the state is obligated to
extend to citizens as a legal right.150
At the heart of the United States’ argument, however, lies a moral claim.
Positive international law views the National Security Strategy and the war against
Iraq as illegal. But the Bush Administration claims that the law must change, and
the reason the law must change is because it fails to provide nations with the
ability to defend themselves effectively. The Bush Administration is advancing an
argument against imminence. It is a moral argument about the parameters of selfdefense and how self-defense must be construed to be fair and responsive to the
needs of defenders.151
International law should be responsive to such a moral claim. In another
context, Thomas Franck argues that international law should accept the moral
principle of necessity because rule of law is undermined by the failure to allow for
right action.152 Thus, despite the fact that international law may be more staunchly
positivist than domestic criminal law, moral principles are important in each
sphere.153
Another difference between the two fields is their dispute resolution
systems.154 But the difference between the United Nations and the American
standard represents a moral theory of international politics requires some defense beyond
the assertion that America has the power to act as she sees fit.” Id. at 40.
148.
DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 180.
149.
Id. at 181.
150.
See generally Claire Oakes Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to
Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (1999) (noting this
is the common assumption and the difficulties inherent therein). Some theorists situate the
right to self-defense within political theory. See infra text accompanying notes 173–74.
151.
Cf. George P. Fletcher, Rights and Excuses, 3 CRIM. J. ETHICS 17, 19 (1984).
In these situations of justification, the infliction of harm is either right as
a matter of principle or at least permissible in view of the interests at
stake. The actor need not feel remorse about inflicting harm in order to
stifle a wrongful aggressor; what he is doing is right. Further, this claim
of right is plausible regardless whether the right is anchored in the
enacted law at [the time of trial]. Self-defense is right as a matter of
principle.
Id.
152.
Cf. FRANCK, supra note 45, at 174–91 (arguing, in the context of
humanitarian intervention in the absence of Security Council approval, that positive
international law, like the criminal law in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, must recognize
what is morally right or the law itself will be undermined).
153.
It is true that the United States as a superpower has a much greater ability to
change the law than does the battered woman. But the ability to change the law does not
affect the question of whether the law should be changed.
154.
See Burke, supra note 16, at 282 (“[T]he individual/sovereign analogy falls
short because it ignores the everyday role that jurors play in American criminal cases. To
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judicial system, while important in some respects, has no bearing on the
imminence requirement. A state claiming self-defense acts first and reports to the
United Nations second. A person acting in self-defense acts first and appears
before our judicial system second. Neither system intervenes until the selfdefensive action is underway or over. But, the imminence requirement sets forth an
ex ante rule of conduct. If this requirement has meaning, then any distinction as to
the adjudication of its breach has little bearing on the question of its content.155
At the end of the day, both the United States and the battered woman are
making two related claims.156 The first claim is that a right to self-defense entails a
right to effective self-defense.157 The battered wife claims that if she waits for a
confrontational situation, she will lose. Likewise, the Bush Administration claims
that any countermeasure to WMD will occur too late.158 Or, as Ruth Wedgewood
permit armies to engage in preemptive attacks is disastrous in part because there is no
feasible and credible process for resolving a dispute about whether an attack is necessary.”).
155.
Cf. FRANCK, supra note 45, at 186 (“The [UN] political organs have
demonstrated their ability and readiness when faced with states’ recourse to force, to
calibrate their responses by sophisticated judgment, taking into account the full panoply of
specific circumstances.”).
156.
A third possible claim is that some harm now means less harm overall. For
example, we might want to intervene prior to another nation’s acquiring nuclear weapons.
David Sloss, Is Int’l Law Relevant to Arms Control?: Forcible Arms Control: Preemptive
Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 39, 53–54 (2003). The reason for this early
intervention is that any use of force now will result in less overall injury than a major
nuclear war. Id; cf. Leo Katz, Preempting Oneself: The Right and the Duty to Forestall
One’s Own Wrongdoing, 5 LEGAL THEORY 339, 347 (1999). But this argument does not
modify self-defense; it seeks to trump it. There is good reason to set the bar very high for
such a consequentalist claim, and require only extreme necessity before rights are trumped.
For a real life example, consider this analysis by Michael Walzer:
The argument used between 1942 and 1945 in defense of terror bombing
was utilitarian in character, its emphasis not on victory itself but on the
time and price of victory. The city raids, it was claimed by men such as
Harris, would end the war sooner than it would otherwise end and,
despite the large number of civilian casualties inflicted, at a lower cost to
human life.
....
We can recognize [the horror of these deaths] only when we have
acknowledged the personality and value of the men and women we
destroy in committing them. It is the acknowledgement of rights that
puts a stop to such calculations and forces us to realize that the
destruction of the innocent, whatever its purposes, is a kind of
blasphemy against our deepest moral commitments.
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 261–62 (3d ed. 2000).
157.
E.g., ROBINSON, supra note 47, § 131(c)(1), at 78 (“If a threatened harm is
such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last moment, the
principle of self-defense must permit him to act earlier—as early as is required to defend
himself effectively.”) (emphasis added).
158.
Arend, supra note 66, at 98.
It can be very difficult to determine whether a state possesses WMD, and
by the time its use is imminent, it could be extremely difficult for a state
to mount an effective defense. Similarly, terrorists use tactics that make
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notes, “a ‘just in time’ defense may not work in an age of instant deliverables.”159
Thus, does the right to act in self-defense obtain when the defender needs to act?
A second claim is that it is unfair for the putative victim to bear the risk
here.160 While an imminence rule favors the would-be aggressor, a broader time
frame favors the would-be victim. The victim points to past conduct of the
aggressor as evidence that the aggressor will strike again. And the victim claims
that if another strike is likely, why is it that the aggressor is given the benefit of the
doubt, while the victim’s life hangs in the balance?
Both of these claims underlie the moral force of the attack on imminence.
After all, if we believed that an attack would occur but that defensive force could
be effectively employed, we would be far less sympathetic to the claim that the
putative victim must act now. Moreover, we are sympathetic to the would-be
victim’s claim that it is unfair to ask her to wait in fear because doing so shifts the
risk of harm to her from the aggressor.
B. Self-Defense and the Necessity of Action
Ultimately, both the Bush Administration and the battered woman want to
act when it is necessary to defend themselves. The putative defender claims that

it all but impossible to detect an action until it is well underway or even
finished.
Id.; see also BOBBITT, supra note 147, at xxi.
We are at a moment in world affairs when the essential ideas that govern
statecraft must change. For five centuries it has taken the resources of a
state to destroy another state: only states could muster the huge revenues,
conscript the vast armies, and equip the divisions required to threaten the
survival of other states. Indeed posing such threats, and meeting them,
created the modern state. In such a world, every state knew that its
enemy would be drawn from a small class of potential adversaries. This
is no longer true, owing to advances in international telecommunications,
rapid computation, and weapons of mass destruction. The change in
statecraft that will accompany these developments will be as profound as
any that the State has thus far undergone.
BOBBITT, supra note 147, at xxi.
159.
Ruth Wedgwood, Strike at Saddam Now, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A16.
160.
Jeremy Horder, Killing the Passive Abuser: A Theoretical Defense, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 283, 292 (Stephen Shute & A.P.
Simester eds., 2002).
A strictly construed imminence or immediacy requirement is the
optimum rule for aggressors in general. It shifts the burden of risk (the
defendant may lose a chance to make a pre-emptive strike, or may lose
the chance to incorporate a necessary element of surprise in his or her
response, and so forth) on to the defender. It shifts the burden in this way
by insisting that defenders stay their hand until it appears there can be no
reasonable doubt about the putative aggressor’s intentions.
Id.
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she must act now to ensure that she will be able to effectively defend herself. Thus,
the claim is that the right to self-defense obtains when one needs to act.161
Many criminal law scholars agree. They argue that the question of
necessity, and not imminence, is the appropriate focus.162 These theorists argue
that the imminence requirement should be altogether abandoned because the
necessity requirement does all the moral heavy lifting. Imminence, they argue, just
helps establish necessity.163 Simply put, if necessity remains part of the elements
of self-defense, imminence—which is just intended as a specific articulation of this
standard—does no work.
Paul Robinson observes that:
Although the word “imminent” appears to modify the nature of the
triggering conditions, it seems, and the drafters of the Model Penal
Code agree, that the restriction is more properly viewed as a
modification of the necessity requirement. That is, as a practical
matter actions taken in the absence of an imminent threat may not
be necessary.164

Hence, “proper application of the necessity requirement would seem adequate to
prevent potential abuse of a justification defense in cases where the force is not
imminent.”165
To fully understand the relationship between imminence and necessity,
consider Robinson’s famous hypothetical. Robinson imagines that “A kidnaps and
confines D with the announced intention of killing him one week later. D has an
opportunity to kill A and escape each morning as A brings him his daily ration.”166
Must D wait “until A is standing over him with a knife?”167 Robinson thinks not:
If the concern of the limitation is to exclude threats of harm that are
too remote to require a response, the problem is adequately handled
by requiring simply that the response be “necessary.” The proper
161.
Rosen, supra note 99, at 375–76 (“By relying on the imminence requirement,
the North Carolina Supreme Court never answered the question whether it was necessary
for Ms. Norman to kill her husband to avoid great bodily harm or death. And is not this the
proper question that should be addressed in Norman and similar cases?”).
162.
Burke, supra note 16, at 279 (“Because the requirement of imminence is an
imperfect proxy to ensure that a defendant’s use of force is necessary, a better standard
would require that the use of force be necessary.”); Jeffrey B. Murdoch, Comment, Is
Imminence Really Necessity? Reconciling Traditional Self-Defense Doctrine with the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 191, 217 (2000) (“Whether a killing was
necessary is a question of fact. Eliminating the imminence requirement from self-defense
merely allows juries to realistically consider, given the totality of the facts of any given
situation, whether the use of defensive force was necessary.”); Rosen, supra note 99, at 380
(“In self-defense, the concept of imminence has no significance independent of the notion
of necessity. It is, in other words, a ‘translator’ of the underlying principle of necessity.”).
163.
Rosen, supra note 99, at 392 (“Imminence remains, as do the other factors in
the case, relevant to the jury’s core inquiry: Was the killing necessary?”).
164.
ROBINSON, supra note 47, § 131(b)(3), at 76.
165.
Id. at 76–77.
166.
Id. § 131(c)(1), at 78.
167.
Id.
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inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the
response necessary in defense. If a threatened harm is such that it
cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last moment,
the principle of self-defense must permit him to act earlier—as early
as is required to defend himself effectively.168

Robinson’s focus is important here. To him, this inquiry boils down to a
necessity determination and the proper focus is on the intended victim. The
question is not “is the aggressor acting now?” but “must the intended victim act
now?”
This view has a significant following.169 Indeed, many scholars believe
the Model Penal Code’s requirement of “immediately necessary” correctly casts
the balance between defenders and aggressors.170 It is believed that “immediately
necessary” will encompass those cases in which the harm is not imminent,171 but,
as Robinson would say, the response is necessary.172

168.
Id.
169.
Stephen Morse, for example, concludes that loosening the imminence
requirement would be unproblematic because the actor would still need to show necessity,
“a showing [which in many locations and under most circumstances], may be difficult or
impossible if the threat is not temporally immediate.” Morse, supra note 37, at 309. Richard
Rosen advocates a burden-shifting approach in which “the trial judge could instruct the jury
that a killing in self-defense must be in response to an imminent danger unless the defendant
is able to meet an initial burden of production by presenting substantial evidence that the
killing was necessary even though the danger was not imminent.” Rosen, supra note 99, at
405.
170.
Schopp, supra note 101, at 69 (“Immediate necessity, not imminence of
harm, should be considered essential to self-defense claims, including those asserted by
battered women.”); Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 127 (“Imminence is relevant only because
it helps identify cases where flight or legal intervention will be impossible, so that violent
self-help becomes truly necessary. The decisive factor is necessity, not imminence per se.
Thus, the proper approach is . . . to require, as proposed in Model Penal Code § 3.04, that
the use of force be ‘necessary on the present occasion.’”).
The Model Penal Code, § 3.04, reads, “the use of force upon or toward another person
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the
present occasion.” (emphasis added).
The use of “immediately necessary” does not resolve all problems, however. It still
fails to tell us when Robinson’s captive must act. Is it immediately necessary to act on the
first day of his capture? How long must he wait? Robinson also views the Model Penal
Code’s immediately necessary formulation as insufficient. “Under such a formulation, D
may have to wait until his last chance to kill A, that is, on the morning of his impending
execution.” ROBINSON, supra note 47, § 131(c)(2), at 79.
171.
Curiously, in practice, states adopting the immediately necessary standard
have typically imposed a more stringent temporal requirement. See Maguigan, supra note
131, at 450 (“The immediacy requirement results in a higher threshold showing for
admission of evidence and in a lower likelihood that instructions are given to the jury on the
relevance of evidence received about the history of other violence, the history of abuse, and
expert testimony.”); see, e.g., Arizona v. Reid, 747 P.2d 560, 564 (Ariz. 1987) (finding
insufficient facts to show defendant was in immediate danger where abused daughter killed
her father while he was sleeping); Kansas v. Hernandez, 861 P.2d 814, 820 (Kan. 1993)
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Moreover, two theorists who purport to give imminence independent
content actually advance sophisticated “imminence as necessity” arguments.
George Fletcher, for example, grounds imminence in political, not moral,
theory.173 Fletcher argues that the citizen may only act for the good when the state
lacks the opportunity to do so:
[T]he imminence requirement expresses the limits of governmental
competence: when the danger to a protected interest is imminent and
unavoidable, the legislature can no longer make reliable judgments
about which of the conflicting interests should prevail . . . the police
are no longer in a position to intervene . . . . The individual right to
self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is
necessary.174

Fletcher’s position is just a sophisticated “imminence as proxy for
necessity” argument. He simply claims that only when it is really, really necessary
may the defendant act. Notice how he views the right to self-defense as “kicking
in” because “immediate action is necessary.” Curiously, Fletcher rejects battered
women’s claims despite striking evidence that battered women make significant
efforts to receive police assistance.175 Yet, according to Fletcher, the right to
engage in self-defense is contingent on the ability of the state to intervene.176 Thus,
one would expect that if a battered woman makes a showing that the police have
failed to protect her, she should be entitled to an instruction on self-defense.177 But
the debate is still about necessity.

(“Although the term imminent describes a broader time frame than immediate, the term
imminent is not without limit.”).
172.
Indeed, English law only requires reasonableness, and Glanville Williams
contends that this requirement implies imminence. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 450 (1978).
173.
Fletcher, supra note 34, at 570.
174.
Id.
175.
See FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 21, 22 (“Retaliation, as opposed to defense,
is a common problem in cases arising from wife battering and domestic violence.”) and
(“Those who defend the use of violence rarely admit that their purpose is retaliation for a
past wrong. The argument typically is that the actor feared a recurrence of past
violence . . . . This is the standard maneuver in battered wife cases.”).
176.
Id. at 18 (“When individuals are threatened with immediate aggression, when
the police cannot protect them, the monopoly of the state gives way. The individual right of
survival reasserts itself.”)
177.
Benjamin Zipursky criticizes Fletcher on this very point:
The most serious qualification of Fletcher’s argument is that it shows
only half of what it purports to show. What it shows is that in cases
where objective imminence exists, self-defense should be permitted.
However, that proposition (suitably qualified) has not been seriously in
question. The more difficult proposition is that in cases where objective
imminence does not exist, self-defense should not be permitted. Fletcher
has said little explicitly in support of this latter proposition.
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 579, 586 (1996) (emphasis added).
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Joshua Dressler recently rejected an “inevitability” standard as justifying
self-defense. Why not allow a battered woman to act whenever the harm is
inevitable? The problem, according to Dressler, “lies in its speculativeness”:
Human beings are far less predictable than funnel clouds because
they possess the capacity for free choice. They are the “wild cards”
in any predictive game. This does not mean that human beings
always defy predictions, or even that specific humans usually defy
predictions; it is enough to say they sometimes defy predictions, and
the likelihood of error rises dangerously when one is merely
predicting some “inevitability,” well down the road.178

This view, that we cannot predict that the aggressor will act until the harm
is imminent, is yet another necessity argument. If we are not sure that the putative
aggressor will eventually go through with the crime, then there is no need for the
victim to act. And, for Dressler, we must wait until there is a need to act in order to
give proper moral weight to the aggressor’s interests. On this account, the question
of whether the putative aggressor will act drives the necessity calculation.
Hence, to many criminal law theorists, the appropriate question is
whether it was necessary for Judy Norman to kill her husband. Norman would
point to her husband’s threats and the escalation of abuse that occurred just prior to
her actions. Norman would argue that her death was inevitable, that she lacked the
ability to prevent death by nonlethal means, that she would not be protected by the
police, and that she could not escape.179 This, of course, is not to say that Norman
would be acquitted.180 But she would be entitled to have a jury determine whether
her action was immediately necessary that evening.
Such a standard is not only responsive to the battered woman’s claim but
also purports to alleviate the significant concerns raised by international law
scholars. Many international law theorists argue that without the imminence
requirement, self-defense lacks an objective criterion for the permissible use of
force. 181 In their view, without imminence, self-defense will deteriorate to nothing
178.
Dressler, supra note 30, at 274–75.
179.
Sebok, supra note 146, at 728 (arguing the need to meet these three
elements).
180.
Problematically for Norman, the North Carolina Supreme Court argued that a
fear of death on Norman’s part was not reasonable given that she had never previously been
subjected to deadly force. North Carolina v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989) (“Such
predictions of future assaults to justify the defendant’s use of deadly force in this case
would be entirely speculative, because there was no evidence that her husband had ever
inflicted any harm upon her that approached life-threatening injury, even during the ‘reign
of terror.’“); see also Sebok, supra note 146, at 746–47 (arguing that it would be difficult
for Norman to prove that it was highly probable that her husband would ever kill her).
181.
DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 44 (“On another note, were the Preemption
Doctrine to gather steam, it will become necessary to spell out certain objective criteria that
must be established before the use of force is to be permitted. In the absence of such
objective criteria, the Doctrine could be invoked based on subjective fear and might become
uncontrollable.”); O’Connell, supra note 43, at 19.
If America creates a precedent through its practice, that precedent will be
available, like a loaded gun, for other states to use as well . . . .
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more than subjective fear.182 A second, related concern is that this approach leads
to devolution of decision-making power from the United Nations to the individual
nations. Thus, there will be increased violence and it may be less organized,
leading to an “increase [in] instability and anarchy.”183
The “immediately necessary” standard seems to answer these concerns.
“Immediately necessary” is an objective determination that the international
community should be equipped to adjudicate. Indeed, international law must
currently cope with adjudicating whether an attack is “imminent.” Thus, so long as
an objective determination is being made, international use of force should not
deteriorate to subjective fears.
Moreover, while many scholars believe the Security Council should retain
control over handling threats that are not imminent, this claim fails for the same
reason that urging battered women to seek police protection fails.184 Indeed, the
Security Council is more political and has less legitimacy than a local police force.
As Dinstein notes, “[j]ust as the Council may take action against a threat to the
Preemptive self-defense would provide legal justification for Pakistan to
attack India, for Iran to attack Iraq, for Russia to attack Georgia, for
Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, for North Korea to attack South Korea,
and so on. Any state that believes another regime poses a possible future
threat—regardless of the evidence—could cite the United States invasion
of Iraq.
Id.
182.

E.g., Stahn, supra note 4, at 45.
To replace the requirement of an imminent danger by that of a
“sufficient danger” transforms the very essence of self-defense. It would
allow unilateral action by a state on its own decision, on the basis of its
own findings, and on its own characterization of those facts. Such an
empowerment of the “self” shakes the foundations of the concept of selfdefense because it breaks with the principle that “no state is actually the
sole judge of its own cause” when exercising self-defense.
Id. Dietrich Murswiek argues:
Should this view prevail and become a new rule of international law, the
general prohibition of the use of force will be abolished for all intents
and purposes. There are many States ruled by “rogues.” If every nation is
permitted to make war on every other nation it regards as a “rogue
State,” there will be no more international security.
Murswiek, supra note 86.
183.
DRUMBL, supra note 4, at 23. Mark Drumbl argues that “[a]s there is more
and more scope for self-defense, the importance of the nation-state rises and the influence of
international institutions in the decision whether or not to use force wanes. This may well
create a situation in which the deployment of lethal force in self-defense becomes
inconsistent, perhaps even indeterminate.” Id. at 35; see also Stahn, supra note 4, at 49 (“If
the Bush doctrine became the new law, it would have devastating consequences for world
public order. . . . It would transform the existing system from a rule of law-based framework
to a balance of power system.”).
184.
These scholars claim that while the right of self-defense for an attack that is
actually instant and overwhelming will be preserved, when the imminence requirement is
not met, the Security Council can evaluate evidence and determine when action is
necessary. Stahn, supra note 4, at 49. Article VII vests the Security Council with authority
to “maintain or restore international peace or security.” DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 279.
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peace which is imperceptible to the public eye, it may also decline to acknowledge
the existence of a manifest threat to the peace.”185 Conversely, if UN action is
possible, then actions will not be deemed “immediately necessary.”186
Hence, articulating “necessary on the present occasion” should be the
international lawyer’s agenda.187 It is true that international lawyers will now have
to think about what acts can give rise to an honest and reasonable belief,188 but
there is no reason to think that the objectivity of the defense is lost with the
abandonment of imminence. Thus, there remains, in international law guise, a
requirement of an honest and reasonable belief that the force is necessary. If this is
still an element of self-defense, all the concerns that attacks will be based on
subjective fears are misguided. Rather, the imminence requirement was helpful
only insofar as it articulated a specific way in which that belief might be honest
and reasonable.
The standard of “immediately necessary” speaks to the claims of battered
women and nations threatened with weapons of mass destruction. It entitles them
to act when they must so that they may protect themselves. Unfortunately, this
standard rests on a faulty conception of self-defense and therefore fails.
Self-defense is not a simply a species of necessity. Rather, self-defense is
a limited entitlement to respond to aggression. Imminence plays a pivotal role in

185.
DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 283.
186.
One problem with this approach is that the very authority found to be inept
(the UN) is the same body that adjudicates whether it was inept. The domestic legal system
can more easily resolve protection failures because the police do not adjudicate the
necessity of action, a jury does.
187.
See, e.g., Arend, supra note 66, at 98. Arend asks, “[w]here does one draw
the line?” Is possession of WMD sufficient? But “[g]iven the current realities in the
international system, India would be able to use force against Pakistan, and vice versa; Iraq
could target Israel; and many states could target the United States, Great Britain, France,
China, and Russia.” Id. What of hostile intent, which arguably could allow for intervention
even before the possession of WMD? “In a sense, Israel was making this kind of claim
when it struck the Osirak reactor in 1981.” Id.
188.
Some scholars have already started to attempt to articulate those standards.
Thomas Graham suggests using four questions proffered by Richard Maxon to analyze
a situation to determine if it can be justified by self-defense:
“Are there objective indications that an attack is imminent? Factors such
as troop buildups, increase alert levels, increased training tempo, and
reserve call-ups may suggest that an attack is imminent.”
“Does the past conduct or hostile declarations of the alleged aggressor
reasonably lead to a conclusions that attack is probable?”
“What is the nature of the weapons available to the alleged aggressor
nation, and does it have the ability to use them effectively?”
“Is the use of force the last resort after exhausting all practicable,
peaceful means?” Diplomacy is always the best course to take for longterm success if possible.
Graham, supra note 67, at 9 (quoting Richard G. Maxon, Nature’s Eldest Law: A Survey of
a Nation’s Right to Act in Self Defense, 25 PARAMETERS 55, 62–63 (1995) (emphasis
omitted)). David Sloss advocates Security Council intervention prior to a country’s
introduction of nuclear material into a facility. Sloss, supra note 156, at 53–54.
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the right to self-defense as it defines what types of threats constitute aggression,
and separates self-defense from self-privilege.

IV. IMMINENCE AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
Imminence should not be subsumed within necessity. The “immediately
necessary” standard obfuscates the important distinction between self-defense and
self-preference. Moreover, theorists who contend that imminence is simply a proxy
for necessity mistakenly presuppose that imminence has no import of its own.
However, imminence does have an independent purpose as it serves as the actus
reus of aggression and it is our understanding of aggression and threats that
distinguishes self-defense from other acts of self-preference.
A. The Failures of the “Immediately Necessary” Standard
Despite the intuitive plausibility of the “immediately necessary” standard,
it should be rejected. First, the “immediately necessary” standard obscures the
important distinction between self-defense and other self-preferential acts. Second,
proponents of the “immediately necessary” standard have simply assumed that the
only purpose of the imminence requirement is to establish necessity. However, the
challenge of battered women has led these theorists astray. The “immediately
necessary” standard is being applied to Robinson’s hostage and to battered women,
but the very fact that they are deemed hostages undermines the force of the
argument. Ultimately, most battered women cases do not constitute challenges to
the imminence requirement; they are merely examples of a kidnapping/hostage
paradigm where imminence is not required.
1. Self-Defense and Self-Preference
Self-defense is distinguishable from other necessary acts of selfpreservation. Consider two versions of the famous English case, Regina v. Dudley
and Stephens.189 In the first version, as it really happened, four men were in a
lifeboat with almost nothing to eat for twenty days.190 Dudley decided that they
should kill and eat Richard Parker, the cabin boy.191 Parker, who had consumed
significant amounts of seawater, was close to death.192 The men ultimately killed
Parker and fed upon his body.193 After being rescued, Dudley and Stephens were
charged with murder.194 In deciding whether the men had committed homicide, the
court was quick to point out that Parker was not a threat to the men, and they were
not acting in self-defense.195 Because their claim did not sound in self-defense, the

189.
14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
190.
Id. at 273–74.
191.
Id. at 274.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. at 273.
195.
Id. at 279 (“it is not even suggested that his death was due to any violence on
his part attempted against, or even so much as feared by, those who killed him”).
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justificatory claim was necessity—that the defendants had chosen the lesser evil.196
However, the court did not allow necessity to be a defense to homicide,197 a
limitation that remains the rule in many jurisdictions.198
Now imagine a scenario where the defendants would claim self-defense.
Imagine that Parker blames Dudley for their situation. Parker then lunges at
Dudley with a knife. Dudley may certainly kill Parker in self-defense.
In some respects, these cases are quite similar. In the actual case, Dudley
and Stephens claimed their actions were necessary because they lacked an
alternative source of food and did not foresee rescue prior to their deaths. In the
hypothetical case, the use of defensive force is likewise premised upon an
assessment of the probabilities and alternatives. For defensive force to be
necessary, the self-defender must reasonably believe that harm to her is likely and
that she has no alternative to the use of force.
The difference between the two cases is that the first is a self-preferential
killing, while the second is self-defensive. All self-defense cases are instances of
self-preference, but not all self-preferential actions constitute self-defense. What is
unique about the self-defense case is that the act of force is employed to ward off
an unjust immediate threat. Conversely, in the first scenario, the act was not
defensive as Parker did not pose a threat to the men.199
Self-defense is treated differently from other necessary acts of selfpreservation. We may object to killing Richard Parker in Regina v. Dudley and
Stevens, but we would not deny the right to kill in the case of self-defense.
Existing law reflects this sentiment. The necessity justification is the least
recognized justification,200 and many common law jurisdictions still retain the
limitation that necessity (and duress) are not defenses to murder.201 In contrast, no
196.
197.
198.
199.

DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 22.04, at 292–93.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293–94; see also infra note 201.
UNIACKE, supra note 33, at 191.
The rights, and especially the equal rights, of other people limit the
positive right to act directly to resist, repel, or ward off the infliction of
unjust harm. For instance, I have no positive right to defend myself by
forcibly using an unoffending person as a shield against attack, or by
deflecting an unjust threat aimed at me to an innocent bystander who
will then be killed.
Id.; see also FLETCHER, supra note 48, at 34 (noting the purpose of self-defense is to “repel
the attack.”).
200.
ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 97 (necessity is the least common justification
in American criminal codes).
201.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-417(c) (2003) (“An accused person may not
assert the defense under subsection A for offenses involving homicide or serious physical
injury.”); Peals v. Arkansas, 584 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark 1979) (“However, justification as argued
under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-504, (Repl. 1977), does not appear to be appropriate in a charge
of homicide. We have found no case in any jurisdiction which holds that the ‘choice of
evils’ justification has been applied to a homicide case when self-defense is argued by the
accused.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030(1) (2002) (“[N]o justification can exist under
this section for an intentional homicide.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.026(1) (2003) (“conduct
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jurisdiction rejects the right to self-defense.202 And, of course, self-defense is a
defense to murder.203
Additionally, self-defense allows the killing of any number of culpable
aggressors. As Jeff McMahan notes, “[A]ccording to commonsense morality, an
Innocent Victim is permitted to kill a [culpable aggressor] irrespective of
differences in age, quality of life, or usefulness to society . . . . She may kill any
number of [culpable aggressors] if this is necessary for self-defense.”204 Numbers
count for necessity, but they do not for self-defense against culpable aggressors.
Finally, consider Tort law. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Company205 was a classic instance of necessity. A boat was legally docked prior to
a storm, and the boat owner made the reasonable decision not to leave the dock
once a terrible storm began. However, in keeping the boat tied to the dock, the boat
owner caused considerable damage to the dock.
Famously amending the rule in Ploof v. Putnam,206 the court held that the
privilege of necessity was a limited one. Although the dock owner could not untie
the boat, the dock owner was entitled to damages from the ship owner. The ship
owner thus could not redistribute the loss from himself to the dock owner. The
privilege to act in necessity is a privilege we pay for.
We need not, however, pay to exercise the right to self-defense. If A
points a gun at B, and, B reasonably perceiving A to be a threat, kills A, A need
not pay B’s family for the right to privilege her life over B’s. In the case of
necessity, one must compensate for the infringement of the right; in the case of
self-defense, we do not deem the aggressor’s right to be violated or infringed. 207

which would otherwise constitute any crime other than a class A felony or murder is
justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an
imminent public or private injury”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-212 (2003) (“A person is not
guilty of an offense, other than an offense punishable with death, by reason of conduct
which he performs under [duress].”); Esquibel v. New Mexico, 576 P.2d 1129, 1132 (N.M.
1978) (“We hold that duress [necessity] is a defense available in New Mexico except when
the crime charged is a homicide or a crime requiring intent to kill.”); WIS. STAT. § 939.47
(2003) (“[Necessity] is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except
that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is
reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide.”).
202.
See supra note 42.
203.
See generally id.
204.
Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104
ETHICS 252, 261 (1994).
205.
124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
206.
71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
207.
Cf. George P. Fletcher, The Right to Life, 13 GA. L. REV. 1371, 1386, 1388
(1979) (arguing that Thomson’s infringement/violation dichotomy, which she employs to
explain why acts based on necessity require compensation, “doesn’t map neatly” onto selfdefense and that when we act in self-defense we likewise infringe a right but that
compensation is not owed); see generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on
Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REV. 45 (1977) (distinguishing rights violations from rights
infringements).
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In summary, self-defense is commonly distinguished from necessity.
There are certainly instances where self-preference is allowed and results in the
lesser evil. But we pay to prefer ourselves, and this preference may be limited.
Self-defense, in contrast, is a special kind of self-preference. An individual who
acts in self-defense does not owe compensation, and is permitted to harm, and
even kill, other people.
The “immediately necessary” standard for self-defense elides the
distinction between self-defense and self-preference. Recall that the argument for
the abandonment of imminence is that a defender should be able to act as early as
is necessary to defend herself effectively. Problematically, the “immediately
necessary” standard operates independently of the intentions, capabilities, or
actions of a putative aggressor.
First, the intentions of the putative aggressor are irrelevant. Assume that
A is a friend of B.208 A always carries a gun and is a quick shot. B likewise carries a
gun, but cannot draw quickly. Unbeknownst to A, B is having an affair with A’s
wife. B also believes that sooner or later A’s wife will confess to the affair, and that
A is quite hot-tempered and jealous. Thus, if B is around A when A finds out, B
knows that he is dead. May B kill A now?
Assume that everything B believes is reasonable. And, if B does not act,
there will come a time when A finds out, and B will not be able to act to defend
himself against the attack. If the right to self-defense obtains as early as is
necessary to defend himself effectively, B may kill A now. Thus, despite the fact
that A lacks any intention to kill B now, the need to act may arise.209 Under an
“immediately necessary” standard, one can no longer distinguish Dudley and
Stephens from acts of self-defense on the basis of the “culpability” of the aggressor
because the need to act may obtain prior to the formation of a culpable intention.
The same problem arises regarding capabilities. The United States
currently must confront the embarrassing situation that no weapons of mass
destruction have yet to be found in Iraq, nor does it seem that such weapons will
ever be found.210 But does that matter? President Bush recently argued that the war
was nevertheless justified: “If [Saddam Hussein] were to acquire weapons, he
would be the danger . . . . That’s what I’m trying to explain to you. A gathering

208.
This is a slight variation of a hypothetical suggested to me by Larry
Alexander.
209.
Or, consider a country that has weapons of mass destruction and is currently
on friendly terms with the United States. If the United States suspects that in an upcoming
election, the citizens of that nation will elect a zealot with anti-Western ideas, may the
United States strike now? Cf. David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, A Nuclear Headache:
What if the Radicals Oust Musharraf?, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 30, 2003), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/30/international/asia/30DIPL.html.
210.
See Richard W. Stevenson & Thom Shanker, Ex-Arms Monitor Urges an
Inquiry on Iraqi Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2004, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/29/politics/29WEAP.html?th (quoting Dr. David Kay, the
former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, as stating that “we were all wrong” in believing that
Iraq had large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction at the start of the war).
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threat, after 9/11, is a threat that needed to be dealt with, and it was done after 12
long years of the world saying the man’s a danger.”211
Under an “immediately necessary” standard, President Bush’s claim is
correct. If the President believed that when Saddam Hussein acquired weapons of
mass destruction, he would attack, and believed that at that time the United States
would have no way to abate the harm, then the right to self-defense would obtain
prior to the acquisition of such weapons. After all, this early intervention is when
the United States would have the ability to defend itself effectively.
Finally, not only does the necessity standard not require any current
intention or capability on the part of the “aggressor” but it also treats the likelihood
of threat and the availability of alternatives as even trade-offs. For example, at a
point in time (“t1”), one might predict that the chances that A will try to kill B are
30%, but if B acts now, his likelihood of success is 70%. Later (“t2”), the
likelihood that A will kill B might increase to 70%, but B’s likelihood of success
may decrease to 30%. If the only standard is that B may act as early as is necessary
to defend himself effectively, then B can act at t1. But this trade-off in probabilities
is a trade-off of A’s life against B’s. While the necessity standard may allow B to
act at t1, we may legitimately ask whether this is fair and appropriate.
Hence, the defender’s need to act may arise prior to the formation of a
culpable intention by the aggressor or the acquisition of armaments necessary to
launch an attack. If the right to self-defense is simply a right to act as early as is
necessary to defend oneself effectively, then the need to defend may very well
arise far before the initiation of any aggression.
How, though, can an “immediately necessary” act of self-defense be
distinguished from actions premised on the general justification of necessity? Both
defenses seem to begin and end with an assessment of need based on probabilities
and alternatives. The need to act is the only morally relevant feature for both.
Thus, the “immediately necessary” standard collapses all instances of selfpreference into self-defense.
Moreover, requiring that the action be “immediately” necessary will not
prevent this collapse. It is “immediately” necessary for B to act at t1 if B wishes to
preserve his chances of success. As Robinson notes, the immediacy requirement
does little to resolve the question of whether his hostage may attack early or must
wait until the knife is at his throat.212 Indeed, were Judy Norman’s actions
immediately necessary? It appears that any time the probabilities are in favor of the
defender, the passage of time itself may affect that defender’s effectiveness, thus
rendering it necessary to act immediately to preserve one’s chances of success. If
action is authorized when necessary, the immediacy requirement does no work.
One might also wish to prevent this conceptual collapse by suggesting
that the “immediately necessary” standard does not fully encompass the right to
self-defense. Rather, the right to self-defense includes not only the need to act, but
211.
Richard Stevenson, Remember ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’? For Bush,
They Are a Nonissue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/politics/18PREX.html?th.
212.
See supra note 170.
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also more specifically, the need to respond to aggression.213 The first part of the
test need not fulfill the requirements of the second.
We may certainly wish to require not only that the defender’s action be
necessary but also that the threat be of a certain type. But this is the important
point. The trouble with the “immediately necessary” standard is that it is singularly
focused on the needs of the defender, thus ignoring the defining aspect of selfdefense—that self-defense is an action against a threat. Hence, the need to act is
itself insufficient to distinguish self-defense from other acts of self-preservation.
2. The Role of Imminence
Not only is the “immediately necessary” standard problematic because it
fails to distinguish self-defense from other self-preferential acts, but also there is
no reason to assume that the imminence requirement is subsumed within the
necessity standard. As discussed above, many criminal law theorists view
imminence as a way of establishing necessity. If a threat is imminent, the need to
act is clear. Among a constellation of factors that are able to establish necessity,
imminence provides one clear method for so doing.
It is certainly true that imminence does serve this role. When a threat is
imminent, the actor is in a “do or die” situation. Conversely, if the aggressor’s
threat is not yet imminent, the need to act may not be apparent. The aggressor may
change her mind. The defender may have time to seek out other alternatives to the
use of force. A variety of other factors could foil the aggressor’s plans. Thus, when
a threat is not imminent, we may legitimately question whether the actor needs to
act.
However, simply because imminence is a way of establishing necessity
does not mean that imminence has no conceptual purchase of its own. Recall that
Robinson imagines a captive victim, informed by a would-be aggressor that the
aggressor will kill him at the end of the week.214 Robinson claims that the captive
victim need not wait until the knife is pointed at his throat.215 According to
Robinson, the proper focus is not how close the threat is to completion, but rather,
when must the victim act to assure his defense.216 Thus, it may be necessary for the
victim to act, even before the threat is imminent.
Notably, when imminence conflicts with necessity, the argument goes
that imminence simply drops out of the equation. Robinson asserts that his captive
is authorized to act even when the imminence criterion requires waiting it out.
However, the force of the argument comes from its conclusion—that people have a
right to act when it is necessary, even when the harm is not imminent.

213.
Robinson, for example, requires that “an aggressor unjustifiably threatens
harm to any legally-protected interest.” ROBINSON, supra note 47, § 131(a), at 73. He then
defines an aggressor as “any person who contributes to the threat of harm to the defendant.”
Id. § 131(b)(1), at 73.
214.
Id. § 131(c)(1), at 78.
215.
Id.
216.
Id.
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But there is another possibility—one that Robinson only briefly
acknowledges: in considering whether D should be required to wait until A’s threat
is imminent, Robinson notes:
Such a view is not entirely inappropriate since it gives A the
opportunity to change his mind about killing D, and it thereby
avoids the loss of either life. But one may disagree as to whether it
is appropriate to give the opportunity to A at D’s expense, by
forcing D to risk the chance that A will decide to kill him a day
earlier.217

In the context of Robinson’s hypothetical, his conclusion, that D may act
now, certainly seems correct. But why? Robinson’s hypothetical takes place during
a kidnapping. One might believe that deadly force is necessary to stop the
continuing offense of kidnapping irrespective of whether A threatens D with death
or has promised D that he will release him upon payment of a ransom. If D cannot
escape without killing A, this alone is sufficient justification for the use of deadly
force. While Robinson’s hypothetical illustrates an instance where the defender
has no alternative to the use of deadly force, it does so by simultaneously
introducing an alternative justification for the use of self-defense.
Most of our intuitions in battered women cases are likely the result of the
kidnapping paradigm. If Judy Norman cannot escape her husband, she is a hostage.
This hostage-analogy does significant work in advancing the claim of
“immediately necessary” self-defense because the kidnapping itself is continuingly
invading the victim’s rights, and thus, while the kidnapping is occurring, there is
no need to look to imminence.218
While a full argument is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems that
hostage-situations, like slavery, are the sorts of harms to persons that warrant
deadly force. The abusive husband prevents the battered wife from pursuing her
own projects and from defining herself. This denial of personhood warrants the
employment of deadly force.219
217.
Id. § 131(c)(2), at 79.
218.
In this respect, Martha Mahoney misses the true import of her theory of
separation assaults because she employs the theory to argue that a temporal requirement has
been met, rather than seeing that no temporal requirement is necessary. See Mahoney, supra
note 15, at 87.
For an examination of the possibility of using the kidnapping standard that exists
within current law, see Gregory A. Diamond, Note, To Have But Not to Hold: Can
“Resistance Against Kidnapping” Justify Lethal Self-Defense Against Incapacitated
Batterers?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 729 (2002).
219.
Cf. EWING, supra note 99, at 78–85 (offering a theory of psychological selfdefense as legal justification); Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do
They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757, 799 (1996)
(acceptance of imminence standard in battered women cases “implicates a refusal to grant
significance to those ongoing relationships of domination, terror, and despair in which an
efficient or, at the least, a clever tyrant may be able to deprive a subject of her freedom
without resort to the use of the ultimate unlawful threat”); Horder, supra note 160, at 291
(“There are, it seems to me, important similarities between hostage situations and the
relationships of domination, unpredictability, and violence in which battered women find
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Indeed, the sanitized version of the Norman facts, offered by both
appellate courts, fails to reveal the full contours of Judy Norman’s situation. By
foregrounding the search for the threat of deadly force, the courts obscure the other
reasons why Norman properly used deadly force. Judy Norman married J.T.
Norman when she was a child—she was but fourteen years of age. She could never
escape him. During her time in captivity, she was “forced into prostitution”—that
is, Judy Norman was repeatedly raped. It is not hard to believe that J.T. never
planned to kill his captive, and why would he?220 He had a slave whose life (not
whose death) he could dominate. There was not an imminent or inchoate threat of
death. There was an ongoing and persistent denial of life.
Hence, ironically, the battered woman’s situation that has created the
greatest pressure on the imminence requirement does so because theorists
continually stipulate to the most important fact: the battered woman’s inability to
leave. If it is in fact the case that the battered woman can show that she is a
hostage and cannot escape her husband, this alone should be sufficient for the
exercise of deadly force.221

themselves trapped.”); Sebok, supra note 146, at 754 (arguing the denial of the battered
woman’s autonomy is sufficient to justify self-defense); Stark, supra note 15, at 1009
(offering a “coercive control” model of battering); Zipursky, supra note 177, at 611.
Not surprisingly, men who violently abuse their wives or partners often
intentionally trap them or intentionally give them good reasons to
believe that they have no genuine alternative paths of relief. They do this
by threatening to find them and beat them if they try to escape (and by
carrying through on these threats); they do this by circumventing legal
authorities if those authorities are contacted, and then punishing the
women more brutally for contacting the authorities, or simply by
threatening to wait out any legal obstacles and carrying through on those
threats.
Zipursky, supra note 177, at 611.
220.
But see WALKER, supra note 15, at 51 (“Women who killed in self-defense
recognized that something changed in the final incident and he was going to act out his
threat this time.”).
221.
No doubt this avenue is mired with issues. Some women do not leave, not
because of fear of retaliation, but because social and economic factors make leaving more
difficult. But these women would not be deemed “hostages” under the analysis above.
Accord Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 130 (“But if the woman is mentally responsible, and if
escape is possible in terms of the social and economic resources reasonably available,
then—even though escape may indeed be difficult—the criminal law, unfortunately, has to
come down forcefully in favor of the hard choice that minimizes violence and saves lives.”).
Alafair Burke provides a clean contrast:
[Imagine a woman who leaves her husband, but because of religious
convictions, behavioral problems with her children, and fear of losing
custody of her children, she returns home.] She is not cognitively
incapable of recognizing escape options; rather, she recognizes her
escape options and makes what she decides is a rational decision not to
pursue them. If she were subsequently threatened with imminent force
by her husband, she would retain her rights to use self-defense, because
her decision to return does not make her blameworthy for her husband’s
subsequent conduct. If she decides instead, however, to shoot her
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Proponents of the “immediately necessary” standard simply assume that
imminence is subsumed within “necessity.” Yet, as we have seen, we may
legitimately question whether the “immediately necessary” standard fully captures
the concept of self-defense. “Need” operates independently of the actions,
intentions, and capabilities of the putative aggressor, yet there is reason to believe
that these latter factors are morally relevant. The following section argues that
there is more to self-defense than necessity and that it is in differentiating the two
that imminence plays a role.
B. Imminence and Threats
The critical question is not when the defender needs to act but what kind
of threat triggers the right to self-defense. Theorists who propose that we switch
what “imminence” modifies—shifting focus from “imminent threats” to
“immediately necessary”—ask the wrong question. The necessity of the defender’s
action to preserve her life may have nothing to do with the current culpability or
capabilities of the putative aggressor. But the need to act remains. Therefore, the
true question that animates the debate over the imminence requirement is what
type of threats trigger the right to self-defense. The correct question is not when
does the defender need to act but at what point is it fair to construe the putative
aggressor as posing a threat?
Recall that there are two senses of the word, “threat.”222 One sense of the
word threat is a forthcoming battery. But threats may also be far more inchoate. In
the latter sense, the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea is a threat to
the United States and a sleeping husband is a threat to a battered woman. The
concept of threat may be further extended—if two people are stuck in a cave with

husband in his sleep, she would not be able to demonstrate that her
actions were necessary to defend her own safety, and would therefore
not be entitled to claim self-defense.
Burke, supra note 16, at 296. In contrast, Rosen seems to grant too much to battered
women. He argues that they have both the right to stay when escape is possible, and the
right to strike preemptively. Rosen, supra note 99, at 396. The middle ground of a “no fair
opportunity” claim also needs to be explored. Cf. Dressler, supra note 30, at 277–78.
The other interesting question under this approach is whether the hostage situation
obtains only when the battered woman truly cannot escape or whether she is likewise
justified (or excused) if she perceives that she cannot leave as a result of battered woman
syndrome. While discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, I suspect that we
may be willing to deem the woman who suffers from BWS justified for the following
reason. If a kidnapper gives a hostage a drug that makes her perceive that she cannot leave
and this keeps her captive, it seems plausible that the hostage is justified in killing her
captor to escape. Indeed, the problem with the current question of individualizing the
reasonable person standard is that it treats battered woman’s syndrome as if it were a merely
coincidental aspect of the defendant’s psychological framework rather than the product of
an intentional plan to dominate and control her.
222.
See supra text accompanying notes 89–91. My thanks again to Roger Clark
for this invaluable insight.
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limited oxygen, each poses a “threat” to the other simply because one individual’s
survival is dependent on limiting the chances of the other’s.223
While our mere existence in some sense “threatens” others, those who
wish to reject the status quo have never been regarded as self-defenders.224 After
all, it seems that no one individual has a stronger claim to the right to life,
existence, or thriving than another. Thus, the right to self-defense cannot be this
broad.
Moreover, the formation of an intention is itself insufficient to constitute
a threat sufficient to warrant self-defensive action.225 When an intention is first
formed, the line between it, and wishes, desires, and hopes is notoriously vague. At
the moment of formation, how does one distinguish a passing fancy from a formed
intention?
Moreover, those harboring evil intentions have control over whether they
will eventually execute those intentions.226 Intentions are often conditional, either
internally or externally, on the occurrence of other events. For example, an
intention to have sexual intercourse with V if she is over sixteen is an internally
conditional intention. But the same man might also have the intention to have
sexual intercourse with V—but if he were to find that she is under sixteen, he
would change his mind—an externally conditional intention. Thus, simply because
one has an intention to harm another does not mean that one will not change his
mind.227
223.
Cf. Kadish, supra note 50, at 890 n.32 (arguing that the Model Penal Code’s
commentary incorrectly designates the mountaineer who, to save himself, cuts the rope on
which his companion is dangling as a case of necessity but that the “dangling moutaineer is
no bystander. He constitutes a threat, although an innocent one, so that the right to resist
aggression suffices to justify cutting the rope). I take the classification of this case to be a
difficult one, although I am inclined to agree with the Model Penal Code’s designation, and
construe threats to be more in keeping with assaults and attacks. See UNIACKE, supra note
33, at 160–72 (arguing that our normative concept of threat closely resembles attacks and
assaults).
224.
Compare Walzer’s characterization of “preventive wars,” a type of war he
rejects:
The sentinels stare into temporal as well as geographic distance as they
watch the growth of their neighbor’s power. They will fear that growth
as soon as it tips or seems likely to tip the balance [of power]. War is
justified . . . by fear alone and not by anything other states actually do or
any signs they give of their malign intentions. Prudent rulers assume
malign intentions.
WALZER, supra note 156, at 77.
225.
Cf. Jeff McMahan, Preventive War, in JUST WAR AND ACTUAL WAR
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 17–18, on file with Author) (arguing that a culpable intention
itself is sufficient to make the aggressor liable, and at that point, a fair distribution of risks
allows the defender to act).
226.
See Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate
Crimes, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1138, 1173 (1997).
227.
Now, it may seem that this claim about intentions collapses into the necessity
calculation. If an aggressor will not follow through on her intentions, then the defender need
not act. True enough. But an aggressor may decide to change her mind at any point, from
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What we seek from our quest for “threats” is the concept of
aggression.228 It is aggression that triggers the right to a defensive response.
Indeed, while the adage “the best defense is a good offense” may be true, it is, by
its own terms, offensive behavior, not defensive behavior. Self-defense is only
understandable as a response to another’s aggressive conduct.
The need for aggression, and not just evil intentions, is justified on both
deontological and consequentalist grounds. As Michael Walzer argues, “[w]hen
we stipulate threatening acts, we are looking not only for indications of intent, but
also for rights of response. To characterize certain acts as threats is to characterize
them in a moral way, and in a way that makes a military response morally
comprehensible.”229 Conversely, David Luban maintains that from a ruleconsequentalist perspective, preventive war (war before an imminent attack) is
unpalatable as it makes war “too ordinary”:
Instead of making the trigger for war the threat of an imminent
attack—the adversary’s unmistakable signal that he has crossed the
line from diplomacy to force—preventive war doctrines make the
trigger a set of policy-choices not much different in kind from those
that states always make—for example, decisions about what
weapons programs to pursue, what alliances to form, where to
station troops.230

Aggression is also morally relevant for domestic criminal law. Theorists
who adopt a forfeiture approach to self-defense claim that the actor loses her right
to life when she poses an unjust threat.231 Moreover, some scholars claim that selfdefense is justifiable only when it is intended to repel a present threat.232 Thus, the
moral assessment of both the aggressor’s and the defender’s rights hinges on some
notion of aggression.
Our understanding of aggression contains several elements, one of which
is action.233 The imminence requirement is best understood as the actus reus of
two seconds after she forms the intention to two seconds after she has pointed a gun at the
defender. That is, even imminent threats present the problem that the aggressor may change
her mind thus eliminating the need to act. The issue addressed above, however, is whether
an intention is itself sufficient to trigger the right to self-defense.
228.
Cf. Arthur Ripstein, Self-Defense and Equal Protection, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
685, 694 (1996) (defining threats as conduct that is reasonably taken to be life-threatening).
229.
WALZER, supra note 156, at 79.
230.
Luban, supra note 147, at 21.
231.
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 27, § 18.04[B][2], at 234.
232.
E.g., UNIACKE, supra note 33, at 162 (“I act in self-defence . . . in resisting,
repelling, or warding off an actual threat.”); see also Russell Christopher, Self-Defense and
Objectivity: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 537 (1998)
(demonstrating the importance of motivation to a theory of self-defense).
233.
The term “aggression” is loaded to the extent that it implies culpable and
voluntary action. See UNIACKE, supra note 33, at 160–64 (noting this difficulty). There is a
debate within the literature as to whether justifiable self-defense should cover the killing of
innocents, and even if so, whether one unifying theory can plausibly account for the killing
of both culpable and innocent aggressors. Cf. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 283, 302 (1991) (“what makes it permissible for you to kill [innocent and
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aggression. This view of imminence is congruent with the criminal law’s approach
to incomplete attempts. The common law’s actus reus formulation requires that the
defendant be in dangerous proximity to completing her crime.234 In contrast, the
Model Penal Code’s substantial step formulation focuses on whether there is
sufficient evidence to corroborate a clear criminal intent earlier in the process.235
Whatever the standard, our understanding of an “attempt” is informed by the
culpable aggressors] is the fact that they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill
you”); with Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification, and Excuse, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
53, 61 (1993) (criticizing Thomson and arguing that self-defense should be sensitive to
numbers, moral fault, fair allocation of risks, and nonappropriation of others); McMahan,
supra note 204, at 252 (arguing against a unified theory); Michael Otsuka, Killing the
Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74, 76 (1994) (arguing that innocent threats
are morally equivalent to innocent bystanders and thus may not be killed in self-defense).
There are compelling arguments on both sides. There seem to be strong cases for
allowing self-defense against innocent and involuntary aggression. See generally ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34–35 (1974) (arguing that it is permissible to
disintegrate a falling man who will otherwise fall on you and kill you); UNIACKE, supra note
33, at 157 (“Although the aggressor’s culpability and his danger to others obviously
strengthen the justification of self-preference, neither of these grounds of discrimination is
necessary to the positive right of self-defence.”); Kadish, supra note 50, at 884 (“[T]he
whole concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing collapses in the case of a threat to life by one
who acts without blame—the legally insane attacker, for example, or a very small child.
For, as I pointed out earlier, it likely is the law with us, and certainly is the law in many
Continental systems, that the person attacked may kill such an attacker to the same extent he
may kill a culpable aggressor.”).
For example, enemy soldiers rarely choose to fight in our ordinary sense of choice.
They may be the products of drafts or indoctrinations. They may be young or mistaken.
These soldiers can hardly be thought to have exercised a choice to kill in any meaningful
sense. Additionally, even those who generally reject the right to abortion allow it in
instances of “self-defense,” yet the threat posed by a fetus is innocent and involuntary. See
Nancy Davis, Abortion and Self-Defense, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175 (1984) (demonstrating
the problems with this conception of abortion as self-defense). Nancy Davis has argued that
self-defense against innocents is best viewed as an agent-relative permission. Id. at 192.
Thus, third parties do not have a duty to aid one innocent over the other. Id. at 194–96.
From her theory it also follows that the number of innocent aggressors would be morally
relevant because one can only give one’s own life so much weight.
Conversely, we might query what makes a culpable aggressor “culpable?” Larry
Alexander and I have argued that one has not committed a culpable act until one has
unleashed a risk of harm over which she no longer has control, and thus we should not
punish for incomplete attempts. See Alexander & Kessler, supra note 227, at 1168–74. How
then do we distinguish between the innocent and the culpable aggressor? My co-author has
taken a first pass at this problem. See Alexander, supra note 28, at 1501.
His malicious intent disables him from protesting the preemptive use of
force against him, once the threshold probability—whatever it is—that
he will choose to harm and that harm will result from his choice is
reached . . . . So although his intention plus the danger that he will act as
he now intends do not make him a culpable actor, they do deprive him of
moral standing to object to preemptive force.
Alexander, supra note 28, at 1501.
234.
E.g., New York v. Rizzo, 158 N.E. 888 (N.Y. 1927)
235.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01.
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progress and movement of the defendant from his starting point toward his goal.
The imminence standard in self-defense and the actus reus standards for attempt
both use the language of time and distance to account for a substantive
requirement of action.
In contrast to attempts, however, the actus reus of aggression serves a
different role. For example, the purpose of the Model Penal Code’s test is to
corroborate criminal intent to ensure the prediction is accurate. Under such a view,
however, the action is not independently important. The common law’s test places
the criminal threshold close to completion to respect the defendant’s ability to
renounce. The possibility of renunciation in self-defense, however, is subsumed
within the necessity calculation.
For self-defense, however, the action serves a different purpose. The
aggressor’s action “starts it.” We can only understand defense by comparison with
offense. The aggressor’s action signifies the breach of the community rules and the
lack of equal respect for the defender.236 It is this action that makes self-defense
understandable.237
When the right to self-defense is broadened to any person that might
potentially inflict harm, we blur the distinction between offense and defense. Two
nations may have great disdain for each other and accumulate significant
weaponry in case these weapons must be used. But once inchoate threats are
sufficient to justify self-defense, then both nations are authorized to attack the
other.238 We then have no ability to distinguish self-defensive conduct from
aggressive conduct.

236.
Cf. WALZER, supra note 156, at 79 (“When we stipulate threatening acts, we
are looking not only for indications of intent, but also for rights of response. To characterize
certain acts as threats is to characterize them in a moral way, and in a way that makes a
military response morally comprehensible.”).
237.
Cf. UNIACKE, supra note 33, at 159.
Although “immediate threat” is more accurate than ‘aggressor’ in
referring to someone against whom force is used in self-defence, the
common use of “aggressor” in this context signifies something deeper
than the assumption that most persons against whom force is used in
self-defence are aggressors properly so called. There is an important
conceptual link between aggression and the conditions of immediate
threat relevant to the use of force in self-defence. Aggression is
essentially offensive conduct: it initiates harm or conflict . . . . In contrast
the essential feature of force used in self-defence is, of course, that it is
defensive: it resists, repels, or wards off a threat.
Id.
238.
See also Luban, supra note 147, at 24–25 (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 232 (1980)).
In Thomas Schelling’s imagery, it is always possible that I will have to
shoot my rival in self-defense to stop him from shooting me in selfdefense. The doctrine of preventive war makes shooting a legitimate
option for both of us, and by legitimizing it unravels whatever precarious
equilibrium a broadly-asserted norm against first force establishes.
Id.
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Hence, international lawyers are quite correct in noting that the absence
of imminence causes significant line-drawing problems. Without the standard of
aggression to mediate self-defense, it seems that both India and Pakistan may
attack each other. Indeed, during the Cold War, could the Soviet Union have struck
the United States in self-defense? Jettisoning imminence in the name of necessity
leaves the international community without a standard for the type of conduct
sufficient to warrant defensive force.
It is the aggressor’s actions, and not the defender’s need, that grounds the
right to self-defense. These questions are too often confused. For example,
consider Robert Schopp’s hypothetical where two hikers are engaged in a ten-day
hike across the desert.239 Throughout the race, one hiker, Y, has consistently
attempted to sabotage (and to kill) the other, X. Both hikers are almost out of water
and need to replenish their canteens at the next water hole. Y passes X, whose
ankle is sprained, and, holding a box of rat poison, Y vows to poison the water hole
after filling his own canteen. Schopp asks whether X may kill Y now, while X has
the chance.
Schopp argues that “[t]he central question involves the appropriate
relationship between the necessity and imminence requirements.”240 I disagree.
There is no doubt that X needs to act now. The question is whether Y’s behavior
qualifies as aggression. Schopp himself justifies the right to self-defense by noting
“any culpable criminal conduct infringes on the victim’s concrete interests and
violates her sphere of self-determination as well as her standing in the public
jurisdiction. The aggressor imputes an unjustified imbalance of standing by
culpably violating the victim’s protected domain.”241
Notice Schopp’s emphasis on infringing, violating, and imputing. These
verbs require action on the part of Y, mere evil intentions are not sufficient. Hence,
the real question here, under Schopp’s own analysis, is whether Y’s actions have
risen to the level of violating X’s sovereignty.
In this case, X may act. Y’s behavior is of the sort that we understand to
be aggressive. That is, Y’s intentions, Y’s communication of these intentions, Y’s
recent attempts at killing X, and Y’s present ability to cause X harm in the future
lead to our conclusion that Y is aggressing against X.242

239.
ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS 100
(1998).
240.
Id. at 101.
241.
Id. at 83.
242.
Y’s actions are the sort that would be regarded as intrinsic to a crime, as
opposed to an extrinsic act. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). In contrast, consider the following
indictment of Saddam Hussein:
The real evidence we require is in plain view. Does Saddam, who has
twice invaded his neighbours, who has the unique distinction of having
been the first state to annex another member state of the UN, who has
acknowledged seeking nuclear weapons, developing biological weapons
and using chemical weapons in an unprovoked war of aggression against
his own citizens, who has violated his ceasefire commitments, shot
repeatedly and continuously at coalition forces enforcing the no-fly
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Notice that in making this assessment, X’s need to act is irrelevant. If X
knew that he would reach the water hole before Y then X need not stop Y. Yet, this
does not mean that Y is not aggressing against X or that X’s behavior would not be
intelligible as self-defensive. Rather, in such a case, X may not act against Y
because necessity simply imposes a limitation on the right to self-defense.
Schopp’s hypothetical does demonstrate that the imminence requirement
is sometimes too restrictive. Importantly, however, this act requirement does not
simply corroborate the presence of an evil intention but rather signals the end of
peaceful resolution and an initiation of an assault on sovereignty. Exactly how far
the aggressor must have come may be difficult to characterize. As Michael Walzer
notes, “the idea of being under a threat focuses on what we had best simply call the
present.”243
Additionally, even in those instances of sufficient aggression, the
imminence requirement—in its role as poor proxy for necessity—may limit when
the defender may employ force against aggression. At that point, the debate is
about need and not about threats.
Far too often, however, we have focused on the question of the defender’s
needs and not the aggressor’s actions. The defender may need to act prior to the
acquisition of weapons. The defender may need to act before the aggressor harbors
any intent to harm her. But we must remain cognizant of the fact that the need to
act operates independently of the aggressor’s actions.244 Necessity is a limitation
on the defender’s right; it does not ground it.245 Defenders who wish to act against
threats that are not imminent must not only point to the need to act but must also
make the case that there has been aggression.

zones imposed by the UN in 1991, really stand in the same position visà-vis other countries? States are judged by their intentions and their
capabilities. There is ample evidence of Saddam’s intentions; must we
wait on his capabilities?
Bobbitt, supra note 92.
In justifying the attack on Iraq, Bobbitt does not point to a current intention against the
United States or any present action. Rather, the argument is that his prior bad acts are
sufficient to justify preemptive force. But then the justification is not based on Hussein’s
current aggression.
243.
WALZER, supra note 156, at 81.
244.
Cf. Tziporah Kasachkoff, Killing in Self-Defense: An Unquestionable or
Problematic Defense?, 17 LAW & PHIL. 509, 526 (1998).
The [Indifference Argument] thus takes the fact of the attacker’s moral
innocence to make the fact of his attack irrelevant. But once we make
the fact of the attack irrelevant, we open the door for justifying not only
killing in self-defense when we are attacked by an innocent attacker, but
killing for reasons of self-preservation when we haven’t been attacked
at all.
Id.
245.
UNIACKE, supra note 33, at 156 (“The conditions of necessary and
proportionate force—and according to some, lack of intention to kill—are moral limits of
the right of self-defence: they cannot ground a positive right of self-defence.”).
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The war against Iraq was not a justifiable act of self-defense. When the
United States went to war, Iraq had not aggressed against the United States. The
United States acted against a vicious ruler, who aggressed against his own citizens
and neighbors, who had no love for the United States, who either possessed or
sought to develop weapons of mass destruction, and who defied the United
Nations. Hussein was undoubtedly a “threat to the peace” under Article 39 of the
UN Charter. The United States’ actions might have been deemed “law
enforcement,” if it had had the authority of law. The United States’ actions were
certainly self-preferential. But in the absence of any aggression from Hussein, the
United States’ actions were not in self-defense.
The problem posed by both battered women and the war against Iraq is
that once aggressive conduct has begun, there may be no stopping it. The shift
from inchoate threat to harm occurs without the ability to intervene at any stage in
between. But the right to self-defense is not the right to act as early as is necessary
to defend oneself effectively. The right to self-defense is the right to respond to
aggression.
Prevention cannot be justified as self-defensive. As has been shown, the
imminence requirement is more than a proxy for necessity. Rather it is
conceptually related to the concepts of aggression and defensive conduct. Without
aggression, there is no self-defense, only self-preference.
The compelling need to aid battered women has made the self-defense
argument too easy. In this context, the integrity of self-defense has been
undermined by the jettisoning of imminence. But, in the end, it would be error to
export this bastardized view of self-defense to international law. Rather, selfdefense is worth conceptually preserving. And, for self-defense, we cannot
supplant imminence with necessity.

V. CONCLUSION
In both domestic and international law, the traditional imminence
requirement in self-defense doctrine is being challenged. The emergence of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction led the United States to act when it
believed it needed to do so, despite the absence of an imminent Iraqi threat.
Domestically, battered women claim that they must kill their abusers while they
are sleeping, arguing they are unable to defend themselves effectively in
confrontational settings. These challenges rest on the moral claim that one should
have a right to act in self-defense when necessary. Many criminal law scholars
agree with this claim, contending that the imminence requirement should not
preclude defensive action as imminence’s raison d’etre is to establish necessity.
However, the “immediately necessary” standard proposed by criminal law
theorists conflates self-defense and self-preference. Self-defense is uniquely
justified by the fact that the defender is responding to aggression. Imminence, far
from simply establishing necessity, is conceptually tied to self-defense by staking
out the type of threats that constitute aggression. We cannot simply discard
imminence in the name of necessity.

